February 1965

EDITOR
The Impact of Science on Moral Values

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Poetry and the Sense of Tradition

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

The Relevance of Science; Teilhard de Chardin's *The Future of Man*; *Frontiers of Science and Philosophy*; *The Tiger's Cave: Translations of Japanese Zen Texts*; *The Nasirean Ethics*; *Gandhi and His Relevance for Our Times*; *Sir Philip Sidney and the English Renaissance*

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THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXVI - NO. 2

Point out the 'Way'
however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

Editor:
SOPHIA WADIA

AT YOUR SERVICE

I keep six honest serving men
(They taught me all I know):
Their names are WHAT *and* WHY *and* WHEN
And HOW *and* WHERE *and* WHO.

— KIPLING

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Assistant Editor: Rameshchandra Sirkar

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXVI FEBRUARY 1965 No. 2

THE IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON MORAL VALUES

OUR AGE is essentially an age of transition where all things are changing, and changing so rapidly that many feel somewhat lost. There is much of bewilderment, a feeling of insecurity, and a sense of fear and anxiety, and these make for restlessness. This need not be so if we understand what it is all about, and if we retain a true sense of direction. Old forms must die to make room for better ones. Progress means change and we all need greater flexibility of mind and preparedness to face all changes, while retaining our faith in that which changes not. Adaptability is essential to meet the challenge of our era, the era of science and technology, with both wisdom and courage.

There is so much of confusion as to the role of science itself, and we hear contrary views. Some say: "Science will save us from superstition and fraud." Others declare: "Science is the greatest menace yet invented by man. It will destroy the human race." Some blame all the evils of gross and brutal materialism on science. Science is responsible, they claim, for the threat of total war, for the contamination of our planet by artificial increase of radiation, for the squandering of our earth's resources, for the destruction of wild life, etc. Others worship at the shrine of science, and firmly believe science will free us from all evils and usher in an age of social justice, democracy, and well-being for all.

Both these extreme views, however, are erroneous. Science has given us vast knowledge, and this knowledge has brought us immense power. But it is man who uses that knowledge and man who wields that power. Science is neither good nor evil *per se*. But man is a moral being, and on his choice depends the course of science and the future destiny of humanity. The crisis we face is a moral one, for it is the outcome of the conflict within man himself. Bertrand Russell rightly says:

> We are in the middle of a race between human skill as to means and human folly as to ends. . . . Unless men increase in wisdom as much as in knowledge, increase of knowledge will be increase of sorrow.

True moral values, which alone can survive the outward changes brought about by the impact of science, the explosion of scientific knowledge, belong to wisdom. The need of the hour is for men of wisdom. Mere knowledge without wisdom to guide us in the utilization of that knowledge will make for greater sorrow.

> We have grasped the mystery of the atom [says General Omar Bradley] and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, and power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living.

The real danger then is that of knowledge without wisdom and power without conscience. We need that moral perception which will enable us to resist the temptation to misuse power.

The spectacular advance of scientific knowledge has shaken, nay, swept away, beliefs and dogmas rooted in ignorance, and with these have gone surface moral values with no permanent basis. Revealing the errors and false dogmas of narrow theologies, it has left many with no religion at all. But if the false values have gone, the true moral values remain. If man wishes to do so, he can purge himself of egotism: he can turn from a life of self to a life of service. The things which obstruct man's true progress are of his own making: his greed, his ambition, his selfishness. These are his enemies which he must fight and conquer. Gandhiji tells us:

> All selfish desires are immoral, while the desire to improve ourselves for the sake of doing good to others is truly moral. The highest moral law is that we should unremittingly work for the good of mankind.

True moral values thus spring from the vision of the oneness of humanity. We need to abandon moral values based on the false parallel between nations and individuals and follow instead those eternal values based on the recognition that all men are brothers. Such values have nothing to fear from science. If the religion we follow is that of Brotherhood, science will give us the means of applying our moral principles more effectively in the service of our fellow beings.

No, we need not fear science! We need fear only our own folly and stupidity, our greed and our selfishness. The power which science has put into our hands can be used beneficently and constructively if we become wise and unselfish. Let our moral values be those eternal values which transcend all sects and creeds and belong to the realm of the spirit. Anchored firmly in the One Spirit, we can meet all challenges with con-

fidence and with courage. True morality lies in the awareness of the Spiritual Reality and calls for a disciplined life, a clean and useful life dedicated to disinterested service.

Such a life is not opposed to science. In fact we should all cultivate a truly scientific attitude, which makes for tolerance and, breaking artificial barriers, enables us to eradicate sectarianism, provincialism, isolationism. The scientific temper blends modesty and humility with self-reliance and initiative.

In the words of Jawaharlal Nehru, our beloved late Prime Minister:

> Science has dominated the Western world and everyone there pays tribute to it, and yet the West is still far from having developed the real temper of science. It has still to bring the spirit and the flesh into creative harmony. In India in many obvious ways we have a greater distance to travel. And yet there may be fewer major obstructions on our way, for the essential basis of Indian thought for ages past, though not its later manifestation, fits in with the scientific temper and approach, as well as with internationalism. It is based on a fearless search for truth, on the solidarity of man, even on the divinity of everything living, and on the free and co-operative development of the individual and the species, ever to greater freedom and higher stages of human growth.
>
> EDITOR*

I understand, finally, why the love of God created men responsible for one another and gave them hope as a virtue. Since it made of each of them the ambassador of the same God, in the hands of each rested the salvation of all. No man had the right to despair, since each was the messenger of a thing greater than himself . . .

—ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPERY

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THE SEARCH FOR REALITY

[READERS may remember **Mr. Robert Powell's** article on "Knowledge and Language" in our issue of April 1964. Mr. Powell studied pure and applied science at Amsterdam and London Universities (he holds the PH.D. and the D.I.C.) and is on the editorial staff of a well-known chemical journal in London. He is also the author of *Zen and Reality* (1961), and a frequent contributor to religious and philosophical journals both in India and in the United Kingdom.

His essay is an enquiry into the basic processes by which our mind builds up its apprehension of reality, and into how, so long as a separate "me" is at the centre of this apprehension, anxiety is unavoidable.—ED.]

To most people there is a very sharp dividing line between what is supposed to be "real" and the "unreal," the life of the imagination, the world of dreams. But to the writer the so-called real things are very much like visions in a dream, and at the same time dreams appear to have a real significance in the totality of our lives, for they faithfully reflect the whole tenor of our being; therefore he sees no reason for such a sharp distinction. And he maintains that until we have seen through the whole problem of thought we are still asleep in a very fundamental sense; perhaps what causes at present such excitement and agitation in the mind is only another dream.

You know what we say to someone who is suffering from a phobia, as when he shudders at the mere sight of a spider or some other creeping, crawling creature which is "giving him the creeps." We tell him: "Oh, come on, it is only your idea that the insect is repulsive," and we think the person's fear is completely irrational. Just so, I feel that the "real" world — take anything you like — is only an idea, a thought, "such stuff as dreams are made on," and that there is nothing more substantial, absolutely nothing to intimidate us. Thus there appears to be no concrete basis for any of our ever present fears, and these are seen to be no less irrational than that in the above example.

To appreciate fully how unreal the so-called real is, let us take "oneself" to start with. I do not know if the reader has ever asked himself the question who or what he is. Supposing I look into the matter with a view to uncovering something permanent, something with an identity of its own, I shall have to remove first of all the various labels, arbitrarily affixed, such as my name, title, nationality, occupation, status, etc. Then I must also eliminate all superficial ideas of ownership which give me a spurious feeling of continuity: my family, my house, my bank balance, my reputation, and so on. In this enquiry I see the many desires that bind me, that cause patterns of reaction to crystallize which give my behaviour some

rigidity, some predictability, and therefore strengthen the illusion of continuity, of being a "person." Having seen all this, and thereby divested myself of the mainspring of these desires, the memory of the many things that afford me pleasure, as well as the many painful experiences — what have I left?

Does the exercise not lead to the discovery that one is absolutely nothing? But then it also becomes clear that one's manifestation as a "person" is only the manifestation of the psychological structure of society, and that one's being lies therefore in the collective. But, paradoxically, as this "person" would not exist but for the collective, so the collective would not exist but for the false notion of the self — a veritable vicious circle. Understandably, having this vested interest in the perpetuity of the "me," society admonishes, "Learn to live with yourself"; whereas what is required, of course, is the very opposite: to Live, which is to be altogether free from the demands of self.

But if all "individuality" is of the collective, then there is no such thing as individual thought; in other words, thought alone exists but no thinker.

We may arrive at the same insight by the consideration that thought brings into being space and time, and not — as is the prevalent view — that thought can be superimposed on a pre-existing space-time frame of reference. This could only be if space and time were of a more fundamental order, that is, if there were a "real" physical world apart from thought. The illusion has arisen because we "come into the world" at birth and "leave it" at death (or so we think). So it is evident that our very linguistic habits are significant in this respect; we also say: "I think *about* (*of*) it" and not: "I think it," all the time underlining a separation between thought and the world.

The point is that although the mode of functioning of thought appears to be *in* space and time, this particular framework of reference is also an integral part of thought itself. This is because all sense data are immediately decoded by the brain, as a result of which we experience spatially and temporally, in which form the experience is recorded as memory. The nature of the decoding (or perhaps more accurately: the "transcoding") *is* the space-time world.[1] Thus the reverse of the above statement is also true, that space and time exist only through and in thought.[2] From

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[1] For example, the cochlea *creates* the dimensions of space as much as it registers them.

[2] In this argument we were not concerned with the question if anything exists apart from what we learn through the senses, which is really whether there is anything beyond thought. We have only shown that, if there is, it cannot be in space and time. The question has, however, great interest in itself. Whether sensuous experience and thought are Everything, or their continuous activity perhaps prevents us from discovering if there is the Unknown, something beyond all limitations, can only be discovered by each one of us through understanding to the fullest the Known, the limited world of thought.

this the important conclusion follows that the clue to the universe lies within oneself: the physical universe is to be equated with the mental universe, and there is neither the outer nor the inner. In certain religious writings this discovery has been expressed as: "All is Mind" (but here "Mind" must be seen not simply as the opposite of "matter"). The insight which we have just acquired is naturally highly significant to physicists in their discussions on the limits of the universe, and also to both groups of philosophers who oppose each other as "materialists" and "idealists" (although to us these problems are mere diversions). For it can now be seen that to ask whether the world is finite or infinite, "material" or "mental," is putting the wrong sort of questions, and this can therefore never yield valid answers.

Now what does all this mean in practice? I mean on the strictly personal level, for if the discovery we have made bears no fruit on that level, if it cannot set us free, it has not been worth making; or, more likely, we have not fathomed its full depth and seen all the implications with regard to our life in sorrow.

Let us for a moment go back to the prevalent outlook, in which we have all been educated and which completely shapes our lives. Here we have then (separately): space-time and thought — laying the foundation for our dualistic mode of functioning. Now what is the implication of the statement that there is space-time? It means, does it not, that immediately this is postulated, we have brought into being the entity "me," along with every other entity in the world. The seeing of what *is,* as "things," as "entities," is the very nature of space-time — it is nothing else.

So we have reduced the basic duality of "space-time" and "thought" to that of "me" and "thought" — and let us now see what this amounts to. What is the essential content of thought? If we observe ourselves and others, we shall soon notice that fundamentally thought consists of nothing but an endless number of elaborations and variations on the general theme of acquisition, power-and-"security"-gathering for an artificially created entity, the thinker. This process we all know so well, leading inwardly to the erection of ever bigger walls of self-defensive memories, and outwardly to the various divisions of mankind, by ideologies, nationalities, races, religions, and what have you. The drive behind this activity is Fear, for the "me" stands isolated and in opposition to "the world."

So once thought and the "me," the thinker, stand *vis-à-vis,* thought cannot let the thinker alone; it needs the ego as much for its existence as the ego depends on thought for its nourishment. And in this tussle, the tragic part is that the thinker is all the time under the illusion that he is alone and is producing "his" thought. (Sorrow is really nothing but the painful feelings arising in this process of self-concern and self-pity.)

Obviously, until there is an awakening to the whole mechanism, and it is seen that rather the reverse is a fact, that thought has created the thinker, there can be no let-up in the conflict-producing situation, and so no let-go for the mind.

But now if it be correct, as we stated earlier, that space and time exist only through thought, and not separate from it, then there is neither a "me" nor a "world": there is only thought. And this implies that the "world" is neither "real nor "unreal"! Following from this we can now further state: Within thought, that thought is "unreal" (with the specific meaning of containing a contradiction, and so leading to sorrow) which is based upon the existence of the "me" as an absolute entity that needs to be defended. Comprising all the various psychological influences, beliefs, and opinions about facts, it is part of what we call the world of imagination. What *is* real in this context, however, are the various psychological facts: the fact of my ambition, my envy, my loneliness, etc. Their choiceless perception alone, which implies no contradiction, keeps my feet firmly planted on the ground of reality.

Since my entire world was based on the existence of the "me," and all my relationships were exercises in horizontal, shallow thinking — expressions of concern about how this "me" is being affected by the multitude of factors which impinge upon it but exist only in thought — this whole psychological field collapses, and is now seen to be as unreal as the dream world.

This insight produces a tremendous change in one's outlook, and as a result one feels capable of walking through life with a much lighter tread — for at once there has been an unburdening of all one's "involvements" and commitments. And is it not these involvements that affirm the "me," giving rise to all the delusions?

To be continually involved in all sorts of directions causes the mind to be in a chronic state of tension — the tension of conflict and struggle. This prevents the flexibility and fluidity which are essential if the mind is to cope with the many influences and pressures that close in on it every moment of its life. This tension exhausts the mind and makes it weary, stupid, and dull. The whole of our vital energy is expended in this way and there is none left for the seeing of things as they are — and we need tremendous energy for that. All the involved mind is concerned with is justifying and defending the "me," and how can it therefore perceive that which lies totally beyond thought with all its petty constructs?

However, the important point to realize is that if one consciously tries to break one's attachments, habits and so on, one is still involved — namely, in the breaking. Then the "me" is trying to break the "me" — that is what it thinks it is doing — but is such a thing possible at all?

Surely, the nature of the "me" is inherently the very process of self-defence and self-boosting, and thus — by definition, one might say — it would be impossible for it ever to come to an end through its own efforts. It is, as Ramana Maharshi expressed it so pointedly, "like the thief turning policeman to catch the thief that is himself."

So it must be clear that, once the space-time illusion has triumphed and the "me" has been created, it is already too late to do anything about it. But if one is so fully awake that one can catch the "me" at the moment of its formation without interfering with it, then this very observation will have prevented its crystallization and so the involvement. If in this manner the mind can be prevented from taking roots in any relationship, in any direction, then one is truly free. There is a story of how St. Ignatius de Loyola was asked what he would do if his life's work, his Order, were to come to an end. He answered: "Twenty minutes' meditation and I would be all right." Obviously, this is not what we mean: first, the mind that lives in the Emptiness of non-commitment *never* needs time to struggle free; and second, it is clearly perceived that the idea that we might wriggle out of sorrow by using time is only another delusion.

It is interesting to note that once there has been an awakening as to the whole mechanism we have explained here, although one may then still be caught unawares by thought many times and carried away by the fever of imagination, ultimately truth will prevail and the false will be seen as the false. This break-through to sober reality and sanity, without any effort by oneself, and therefore as the result of something beyond thought, is rather a wonderful experience.

Not being involved any longer does not mean that one has become hard or indifferent. On the contrary, it means that one is as much interested in what happens to others as to "oneself"; and what happens to "oneself" is experienced as no different in quality from what happens to "others" (signifying the end of duality: experience, thought, based on the "me" and "mine").

So, only by forgetting completely all thought of involvement — and this must drop away on its own account because its unreality is perceived — can man cease living in memory, and so rise out of this valley of tears. Then, with the collapse of what we have named horizontal thinking — that is in terms of the outer and the inner in relation to a "me" — the mind is freed from all divisions and all limitations.

ROBERT POWELL

GOD AND THE UPANISHADS

[THE first part of **Professor H. D. Lewis's** article appeared in our issue for January 1964. This is the second and concluding part.—ED.]

II

THE CONCLUSION at which we arrived in the previous article[1] can be reinforced if the Upaniṣads, for which the earlier Vedic hymns and priestly writings prepared the way, can in turn be regarded as bringing to more articulate expression much which had been germinating for a long time before them. It does not follow that that is all they did. But if it is safe to assume the sort of continuity I have suggested — and the anticipation of the teaching of the Upaniṣads in such aspects of earlier Vedic writings as those already indicated seems to warrant that — the Upaniṣads are peculiarly revealing documents for the study of the centuries which preceded them. Some support for this view may also be found in a further more indirect way which may be worth noting here.

This turns on the close similarity between the main doctrine of the Upaniṣads and the speculations of some of the more notable Greek philosophers, including Plato. The parallel between the teaching of Plato, especially where the control of appetite and the conquest of ignorance by some supreme illumination of the soul is concerned, and the main features of Indian thought still awaits careful scholarly investigation; when undertaken, I submit, it will be very rewarding. At the moment, however, I wish only to mention an explanation often given of the similarities between the Upaniṣads and Greek philosophy. It is that both these have elements that go back to a common origin. In offering this explanation, allowance must be made for some measure of interaction between Greece and India in the classical period of Greek civilization. The Pythagoreans and Plato certainly knew something about Indian thought and there is reason to believe that Plato had some contact with an Indian philosopher who visited Athens about the time the *Parmenides* was composed. But on the whole contacts of this kind were scanty, and it seems more plausible to ascribe the similarities between Greek and Indian philosophy to a common origin, unless of course we can regard them as wholly fortuitous. That they were quite fortuitous seems to me very unlikely, since they manifest themselves in early stages of development as well as in the final product. But if we are to postulate some ferment of thought in the East to which Greece and India alike are indebted (as they seem certainly indebted to a common source for their languages) we must place it a very long time before the composition of the Upaniṣads in the eighth and seventh cen-

[1] THE ARYAN PATH, January 1965, p. 4.

turies B.C. That links the Upaniṣads with a process of development over a long time which would undoubtedly be religious in character.

But whatever we make of this particular argument, it is certain that the Upaniṣads themselves provide a remarkable example of speculative thinking, connected closely and at an early date with the practice of religion, which gives us ideas of God's transcendence closely similar to much that we find in theology and the philosophy of religion today. The main theme of the Upaniṣads is that the world is not self-caused or self-maintaining. Its existence presupposes a more ultimate or absolute "first principle." There is thus one Supreme Reality behind and beyond the flux of the world. This is unknowable and incomprehensible.

How the "One" is related to "the many" in the flux of change is a further question about which more than one view may be found in the Upaniṣads and in the work of later writers which they inspired. Sometimes, but not very often, we are left with the impression that the finite world is being treated as a mere illusion or an evil dream out of which we must do our best to wake up. But as a rule the Upaniṣads betray an acuter consciousness than this of the problem of the "appearances" and their status. They speak, for example, of the finite as a self-limitation of the Infinite. In other contexts we read of creation as a self-expression or projection of "the Supreme." This in turn gives place elsewhere to ideas more closely resembling the Christian doctrine of creation. The world exists by the free choice of the One; it is sustained by "the play" of God. The sense in which God would be said to be personal as well as super-personal is sometimes considered, and the eternal is frequently taken to be at the same time immanent in the world. The Transcendent which is "wholly other," in the modern phrase, yet enters into the life of man and lives in him. The Infinite dwelling in the finite and the individual, which is thus also infinite, one with all cosmic existence, gives the idea also of the One Universal Self which is the true self of each individual. To realize this true self through which we are identical with the eternal becomes thus the aim of religious contemplation, intellectual enquiry, and moral discipline. It requires rigorous intellectual discipline and exacting moral self-control. This, in spite of its severity, is not altogether world-denying or always uncompromisingly ascetic. For even the futilities of human life are material for the unfolding of the Divine which dwells in all things. It is detachment and not indifference that has to be cultivated, and this is consistent with high respect for the transient realities of the world and even for the continuance in the world, for the sake of the world, of those who have received the final illumination of their identity with the Eternal Self within them. Hence the insistence on social service, on compassion, virtue, welfare, as well as on study and teaching. But however the relation

of the finite self to the Eternal Self is conceived, and whatever variations of emphasis we may find in the account given of the relation of the one to the other and of degrees of reality (sometimes with corresponding degrees of worth closely resembling the same notion in modern idealism) accorded to finite things, the transcendent character of the Absolute Reality is always very clearly understood in a way which not only lends special interest to these early anticipations of later attempts to conceive the relation of the finite to the infinite, but which also proves exceptionally instructive to those who wish to consider the problem of transcendence as it presents itself today.

The affinity between the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the main contentions of the so-called "Continental Theologians" of today, who have brought the idea of transcendence into prominence and given us a renewed appreciation of its absolute character, has been admirably brought out by a noted student of Eastern thought, W. S. Urquhart.[2] He has also indicated the points at which the absolutism of the Vedantic writers, in the sense of the identification of the finite with the indwelling transcendent reality, would be unacceptable to theologians like Barth and Brunner, and has in fact been denounced by them. But there remains a task that is perhaps yet more important and interesting, and one which it is to be hoped a competent scholar will soon undertake, the task, namely, of delineating the striking affinities which subsist between some of the most incisive doctrines of these Indian scriptures, as yet little known generally in the West, and those growing points of modern philosophy where the main lessons of recent empiricism are giving us a clearer insight into the nature of speculative questions. What positivism and rigorous empiricism have to teach the religious thinkers — and they certainly have a great deal to teach him today notwithstanding much initial incompatibility of aim and sympathy — lies very close to some of the most suggestive teaching of the Upaniṣads and their methods.

A text which has undertones strongly suggestive of very familiar notes in recent thought is one of which we have no record in any extant Upaniṣad, but which is mentioned by the later commentator and religious thinker Śaṃkara. It tells of a pupil who pleads with his teacher to expound to him the nature of the Absolute Self understood religiously as Brahman. To each request the teacher turns a deaf ear until at last he answers the insistent "Teach me, sir," with the words: "I am teaching you, but you do not follow. The Self is silence." Echoes of more traditional variations on the theme of the *via negativa* are also frequent. Absolute being is held not to be a quality of things, but to be almost opposed to

[2] See his *Humanism and Christianity*.

things; but, if it is in this way "non-being" or "nothingness," that is only because its reality is such as to elude predication. No logical derivation of it is possible, although intellectual knowledge has its place in the process by which the intuition of Supreme Being is possible. It is also maintained that, although the Absolute cannot be described discursively, it is possible for the seer to translate his vision into significant terms through hints and images and symbols — we might compare the "slantwise" communication of which Evelyn Underhill speaks. In this process both human effort and Divine grace are at work, and in the unveiling or self-disclosure of "the Real" to us there is also a concealment; if this is not understood in quite the same way as Brunner's "mystery mysteriously revealed," the points of similarity are none the less striking. Equally suggestive of a theme familiar in recent transcendentalist theology, but again understood in ways that have affinity also with absolute idealism, is the denial of the applicability of the distinction of subject and object to Supreme Being. Of the richness and originality and incisiveness with which many of these strikingly modern themes are handled in the Upaniṣads, and of the help the study of the latter may be to us, this is not the place to speak in detail. But I have given some indication of the insight into the nature of the transcendent, and into the way we must approach it in thought, which is to be found in these very ancient religious documents.

It has also to be stressed that, although the Upaniṣads can properly be regarded as philosophical in nature, or at least as containing much that is so and that of rare quality, they are also essentially the products of profound religious vision. To use again the words of Radhakrishnan:

> As a part of the Veda, the Upaniṣads belong to *śruti* or revealed literature. They are immemorial, *sanātana*, timeless. Their truths are said to be breathed out by God or visioned by the seers. They are the utterances of the sages who speak out of the fullness of their illumined experience. They are not reached by ordinary perception, inference or reflection, but *seen* by the seers, even as we see and not infer the wealth and riot of colour in the summer sky. The seers have the same sense of assurance and possession of their spiritual vision as we have of our physical perception. . . . Symbolically, the Upaniṣads describe revelation as the breath of God blowing on us. . . . [They] are vehicles more of spiritual illumination than of systematic reflection.[3]

Finally, the authors of the Upaniṣads are deeply conscious of their indebtedness to others, and often quote texts from the early Vedas in support of their teaching, much as the composers of the *Ṛgveda* in turn

[3] *Principal Upaniṣads*, pp 22–23.

tell us of "the ancient makers of the path." There is a continuity of development, and a transition by almost imperceptible gradations, from the earlier Vedas through the priestly Brāhmaṇas and the mystic Āraṇyakas to the more philosophical Upaniṣads. The latter bring out what is implicit in the Vedic hymns and provide a more express solution to the problems posed by these hymns than they ventured to offer themselves. The notable Hymn of Creation is an unusually striking example of the anticipation of the ripest teaching of the Upaniṣads.

> It seeks to explain the universe as evolving out of One. But the One is no longer a god like Indra or Varuṇa, Prajā-pati or Viśva-karman. The hymn declares that all these gods are of late or of secondary origin. They know nothing of the beginning of things. The first principle, that one, *tad ekam,* is uncharacterizable. It is without qualities or attributes, even negative ones. To apply to it any description is to limit and bind that which is limitless and boundless. "That one breathed breathless. There was nothing else."[4]

What we find in fact very often is that Vedic writers were themselves led to think of the Vedic deities "as different names of the One Universal Godhead, each representing some essential power of the divine being.... They express different qualities of the object worshipped."[5] By re-interpretation the pluralistic elements of the earlier writings come to be held together more firmly in the Upaniṣads as multiform aspects of one supreme religious reality.

Here again, therefore, we seem to find support for the view that the Upaniṣads must be regarded as the culmination of a long process of religious development, one which was becoming increasingly conscious in itself, in which the final achievement is the ripening of what was imperfectly and less reflectively present in men's religious experience long before. This process of development is a complicated one, and there is certainly more involved in it than the emergence into more explicit consciousness of what had previously been only very vaguely apprehended. But all that I wish to suggest at the moment is that the relation between the Upaniṣads themselves and the religious life of the preceding centuries, as reflected especially in anticipation of the Upaniṣads in earlier religious compositions, affords us reasons additional to those already noted for supposing that some apprehension of a transcendent reality, and the worship thereof, has always been a factor in the main development of religious life in India.

H. D. Lewis

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[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 35. [5] *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

THE *GITA* IDEA OF *SVADHARMA*

[**Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy** is Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Karnatak University, Dharwar, and a frequent contributor to THE ARYAN PATH. He reflects upon a doctrine of central importance in the teaching of the *Gītā*: *Svadharma*. In all circumstances the obligation to one's plain duty remains binding. Spiritual excellence accrues from the purity of motive and depth of devotion with which actions are performed, not from the outward attributes of the actions themselves.—ED.]

INTERPRETERS, modern as well as ancient, have been puzzled by the seemingly incompatible strains of thought adumbrated in the *Gītā*. The *Gītā* has proved a happy hunting-ground as much for poets and philosophers as for patriots and politicians. The text has been approached to provide answers for the fundamental problems of religion, sociology, and ethics. More often than not, one sees in this vast body of literature on the *Gītā* a tendency to read into the text one's own ideas. The scholar, who is called upon to clear the ground with objectivity, is himself in a bewilderment when he finds that even dispassionate scholars are divided in their estimates. Some fresh thinking is attempted here on what appears to the present writer the most foundational teaching of the *Gītā*, viz., *Svadharma*, which, if clearly understood, might be of help in piecing together many a seemingly contradictory trend of thought.

No one can deny that the *Gītā* is an episode in the *Mahābhārata* and that the all-too-unexpected bewilderment of the singular hero Arjuna on the eve of battle provides the immediate context in which Lord Krishna's teaching is to be understood. The actual counsel of the Lord to Arjuna is: "Fight like a hero; don't run away." Why should he fight and kill and invite sin upon himself when he is free to avoid it? The answer is just "*Svadharma*." Certainly, Arjuna has his own ideas of good and evil, of freedom and responsibility, and of the values of life. These are the ideas that explain his vacillation, and are to be effectively countered by the Lord. Why do such conflicting ideas present themselves to an individual, especially when a firm decision is required? Absence of conviction indicates not only confused thinking for the nonce, but also the want of an integrated personality. A well-integrated personality is the result of faith in oneself and in the divine order, as also of realized Truth. Again and again, the Lord gives disquisitions on Knowledge and Perfection, on the efficacy of religious devotion and worship, as on the immediate message of *Svadharma*, involving *Karmayoga*. At this point, the question regarding the end and the means assumes primary importance.

It is easy to admit the traditional description of the *Gītā* as a *moksha-*

shāstra; for the *Gītā* does provide instruction on the *summum bonum*. It is not possible to deny the great value it attaches either to disinterested action (*Karmayoga*) or to devotional attachment to God (*Bhaktiyoga*). What is necessary, however, is to decide which of these is the primary end envisaged by Krishna, and understood as such by Arjuna. So stated, the question leads us to the answer that all the three are subordinate to the primary end of *Svadharma*. They are there only to render the complex idea of *Svadharma* not only intelligible but convincing.

The same answer is reached when we approach the problem from another angle. The Lord, by definition, is the Knower, the Perfect. But what about Arjuna? Was *he* knowing or unknowing? Arjuna leaves us in no doubt about his ignorance *vis-a-vis* the Lord, throughout the *Gītā*. Even after he witnesses the Omniform and receives the knowledge of the *Gītā*, Arjuna, in the *Mahābhārata*, never lays claims to perfection. Arjuna, then, deserves to be taken as symbolic of the ignorant man who is yet on the path of perfection. What he seeks is practical instruction in adjusting himself to the demands made by this world, here and now; not precepts in perennial philosophy. Hence the philosophical matter in the *Gītā* deserves to be ranked only as a preliminary, a very essential preliminary perhaps, for the ultimate message of *Svadharma*. Even Śaṃkara, the doughty champion of Asceticism and Knowledge, does concede in very clear terms that; in the *Gītā*, the call to duty receives *greater emphasis* (*yadarjunenoktaṃ karmaṇo jyāyastvaṁ buddheḥ, tacca sthitaṁ, anirākaraṇāt* — *Bhāṣya* under III. 4) and that the Lord has never denied this basic fact. Rāmānuja goes even a step further and equates *jñānayoga* with *para-dharma*, which is the very converse of *Svadharma* (*Bhāṣya* under XVIII. 47).

After thus clearing the ground, we might turn to examining the implications of *Svadharma* as embodied in the *Gītā*. The words *dharma* and *svadharma* are both very familiar expressions in Sanskrit literature on law, ethics, and political science, not to speak of the epics. In early Vedic times the word *dharma* had already acquired the meaning of "established order and usage," "traditional duty and custom," though its root meaning is "prop" or "support," being cognate with Latin *firmus*, or "form," cognate with Latin *forma*. In the period of the Brāhmaṇas, it was at once equated with sacrifice and ritual; so much so that the philosophy of sacrifice is also known as *dharma-mīmāṁsā*. In this sense, it is almost a synonym of *karma* or religious worship. By the time of the law-book of Manu and Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra*, we find the very expression *Svadharma* standing for *varṇāśrama-dharma* or duty as determined by one's caste and station in life (Cf. *Manusmṛti*, VIII. 41; *Arthaśāstra*, I. iii). It is only in the *Mahābhārata* and the *Gītā* that we find the con-

cept explained in terms of *guṇa* or *svabhāva*, i.e. innate endowment of the four castes (Cf. *Mahābhārata*, I. 195, ver. 29; *Gītā*, IV. 13; XVIII. 41-44, 47, 60).

It is usual with modern interpreters of the *Gītā* to assume that the *Gītā* is here rejecting the narrow orthodox view of hereditary caste, and that it is proposing a broad and universal principle of social classification based on propensities and professions. The orthodox dogmatist could well retort that the Lord who created castes in the beginning of time is using the past tense and not the present in the *Gītā* in declaring: "*mayā sṛṣṭaṁ*"; that the castes in their first origin were based on the broad principle, and that the self-same castes have come down to us in a hereditary way. By a feat of dialectics it could be maintained that, in epic and historic times, the four castes were only hereditary. The din of these debates is still in our ears; and we do not see much point in pressing this consideration.

But there is a deeper issue which this controversy conceals, and we should like to pause for its consideration. Granted that in pre-*Gītā* periods the four castes were based on heredity, is there any evidence for concluding that there were just these four castes in India for thousands of years, neither more nor less? On the contrary, there is evidence to show that the earliest hymns of the *Ṛgveda* are not aware of any caste, and that we frequently hear of flexible caste-functions in Upaniṣadic and epic literature. Even lawgivers like Manu have provided equal opportunity of education — both secular and religious — for the three higher castes. And the last labouring class or caste was perhaps racially distinct in the initial stages. What we are trying to drive at is that hereditary caste or *varṇa* was only one of the many factors governing an individual's *dharma*, and not the sole criterion. This has been actually mentioned in the *Gītā*, which speaks of criteria like *jāti-dharma* (I. 43), *kula-dharma* (I. 40, 43) and *trayī-dharma* (IX. 21) besides *Svadharma*. There were customs and traditions of the family as sacrosanct as religious ones. The concept of *Guṇa* or *svabhāva* or "personality type" is an additional consideration which is provided for in the *Gītā* in its message of *Svadharma* to ensure that a fully developed and integrated personality is harnessed to the cause of *loka-saṅgraha* or collective welfare of humanity.

The metaphysical basis for the concept of *Guṇas* is self-evident in the *Gītā*. The three *Guṇas*, viz., *sattva* (purity), *rajas* (passion) and *tamas* (indolence) are as basic to the human personality as to external nature; and these are found in different proportions in different individuals. If a quest for spiritual values is the index of *sattva*, ambitious adventures are the hall-mark of *rajas*, and a life of sensual indulgence the characteristic of *tamas*. One's own nature, coupled with heredity and environment,

dictates the shaping of one's personality, according to the *Gītā*. But to think that, in crucial moments of one's life, everyone can rise to the occasion because of his own personality, though unaided by *Jñāna* and *Bhakti*, is a factitious conclusion which the *Gītā* does not warrant. We have no reason to think that Arjuna was not a fully-developed personality, one gifted by nature and one who had imbibed the best in his heredity and environment. Yet he was vexed when it came to *Svadharma* because he lacked the spirit of *yoga*, whether understood as *karma*, *jñāna*, or *bhakti*.

This should caution us against understanding narrowly the significance of words in the *Gītā*. We should restore something of the universal, cosmic significance of *dharma* in understanding the *Svadharma* of the *Gītā*. If there is one divine law underlying the whole of this universe, man also shares in this law knowingly or unknowingly. It is the law of his very being. It is not only a natural order but also a moral order; and much more than a mere social or economic order. Awareness of this law and a participation in life according to this law is the secret of *Svadharma*. Humanity, as it is constituted, cannot realize it all at once and reach perfection. But, with that end in view, society tries to utilize to best advantage the four natural classes of people, viz., those who work with their hands, those who work with weapons, those who work with their heads, and those who work to keep up the economic balance.[1] Real social progress is possible only when there is a uniform progress in mental-spiritual, political, and economic and material spheres. Each of these spheres creates its own problems and, when the several interests clash, we face difficult crises. It is expected that the best of these classes stand up manfully for their respective ideals and do not allow themselves to be cowed down or cozened into surrendering their ideals. A king should protect his people against enemies, whatever the philosophers might say. A philosopher should abstain from power and pelf, whatever the temptation thereof. A labourer should struggle for the material welfare of the people as a whole, and the businessman should be ready to distribute wealth. All these are ideals; but according to the *Gītā*, the only obstacle which prevents their being translated into reality is selfishness.

Arjuna is a representative of the fighting hero in the *Mahābhārata*. He is born and bred to play his part in time of need. But when the need comes, he wants to run away, talking the language of a philosopher.

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[1] This is what Gerald Heard calls "organic democracy": "the rule of the people who have organized themselves in a living and not a mechanical relationship; where instead of all men being said to be equal, which is a lie, men are known to be of equal value, could we but find the position in which their potential contribution could be released" (*Man the Master*, p. 129).

His *Svadharma* is a duty or debt which he owes, due to his individual position, to his family, society, country, nation, and humanity at large. For everyone who is still a seeker after perfection, the *Gītā* enjoins *Svadharma* as a necessary discipline. By fleeing away from *Svadharma,* by doing *paradharma* (the duty of another), one would not only lose the spiritual goal but also incur sin. Only by adhering to *Svadharma* is there hope that one might reach perfection, sooner or later.

The goal ever emphasized by the *Gītā* is nothing short of *mokṣa* or Perfection. It does not know of any short cut. The Lord, in his Perfection, has the Knowledge that redeems. He keeps on assuring the mortal aspirant too of the self-same Knowledge, provided he practises discipline and austerity in life. While admitting that even an ascetic might reach perfection by the rigours of his austerity, the Lord warns time and again that it is a razor-edge path where success is given to few. In other words, renunciation of duty is nobody's *Svadharma,* not even a Brāhmaṇa's, so long as he is only a seeker. The spirit of genuine *Saṁnyāsa* is more a crowning effect of *Svadharma* than a negation of it. When selfish desire, the evil edge of action, is taken away, it becomes the saving *dharma,* and ceases to be the binding *karma.* It saves humanity and saves the soul too. The Lord of the *Gītā* openly accepts the theory of transmigration of souls, and promises a higher status in lives to come even for souls who cannot root out desire in discharging their *Svadharma.*

The heroes in Sanskrit literature may be looked upon as so many concrete illustrations of the *Gītā* idea of *Svadharma.* If Daśaratha, in the epic of Vālmīki, exiles the innocent Rāma and himself dies in grief, it is because he must always redeem his pledge, his *Svadharma.* It is Rāma's *Svadharma* which makes him desert Sītā and set an example of justice to the world. Duḥśyanta cannot receive Śakuntalā into his palace when he cannot remember having married her. Sītā and Sāvitrī, Śakuntalā and Damayantī, discharge their *Svadharma* as dutiful wives even in the direst of trials. Paraśurāma and Viśvāmitra typify those who lost more than they gained in undertaking *paradharma* in preference to *Svadharma.* We need not multiply instances. *Svadharma* may mean suffering, immediate or incessant. Yet it is ultimately beneficial as promoting the divine design of *dharma.* There is, of course, evil in this world. While it is one's *Svadharma* to root out evil within oneself, to undo evil in others is not given to man, because it is God's *Svadharma*!

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

THE RELIGION WE NEED

[**Professor P. Nagaraja Rao** writes briefly and directly of our need for a religion in the modern world: a religion that will weave the scattered lights of special disciplines and researches into a steady illumination on life itself. We heartily agree that such a religion would be not a creed merely but a discipline leading to a valid *experience*, which would make spontaneous in the illuminated man what the spiritual teachers with one voice enjoin as a code: in the words of the *Gītā*, "Be devoted to the final good of all creatures."—Ed.]

Our age is pre-eminently an age of interrogations and dissatisfactions. Rapid changes are taking place before our very eyes. Systems of scientific and philosophic thought are fast being constructed. Different political programmes are proclaimed by the different dictators and democratic leaders of European states with a view to establishing political millenniums. The great savants of humanity are at one in accusing modern civilization. Our age, they say, has no doubt a substantial body, but its soul is fast dying on account of fatty degeneration and heady emotions. No sane individual, whatever his political creed, is satisfied with the existing order of society. Solutions ranging from incantation to socialism are being energetically advocated.

The great cry of the modern Marxist is that half the evils of civilization are due to religion. Hence the statement "Religion is the soul of the soulless conditions, the heart of a heartless world, the opium of the people." Religion perpetuates the iniquities of the existing social order. R. H. Tawney links religion with the rise of capitalism and explains all social, political, and religious institutions as taking their hue from the economic context.

The great enemies of real religion today are scientific rationalism and totalitarian politics. Scientific rationalism treats man as a mechanism and as the result of the interplay of forces, physical and psychical. Man is identified with body and mind. Totalitarian politics, i.e. the fascist outlook, treats the individual "as a drop of blood in a racial purity, as a cog in a proletarian machine, as an ant in a social termitary." Truth is described in terms of party politics.[1]

The present chaos in civilization is due not to real religion but the want of sound religion. It is the absence of spiritual religion that has led men on to the different pseudo-religions of today: fascism and communism and psycho-analysis. The central life-force of the individual, when suppressed, leads to surprising outlets. The religion we need is one which can

[1] Men who seek to interpret man in terms of mechanics, endocrinology, determinist physics, and psychoanalysis are responsible for the spread of unbelief; cf. *Gītā*, Ch. xvi, the description of the children of darkness (*asuras*).

secure individual salvation and social harmony. Religion is primarily ethics lived. It is not a type of private advancement. No true religion asks us to acquiesce mildly in the existing state of things. Religion is a challenge to reconstruct society on the basis of love and sympathy. The great religionists of the world have cared little for ceremonial observance but everything for purity; they have laid great stress on ethical excellence and service to society. They have ceaselessly addressed themselves to the most exacting task of the remaking of man. They have believed that man can change through education and be perfected by religion.

Before any great change in civilization can be effected the individual must be reformed. Political adjustment and economic schemes, or violent revolution, cannot go very far as long as man is what he is. "Constitutions are not born out of rocks,"[2] observes Plato. They are the result of the dispositions of men. Human unity can only be brought about by a right type of religion.

Genuine religion is progressive; it is never on the side of reaction. It is possible that it may stand sometimes at the crossroads. Religion expects us to do our duty and requires us to contribute our whole self to the betterment of the environment. It cannot be the convenient pious shirking of social responsibilities.[3]

Let us now see what exactly such a religion is. It is a particular type of education, leading to spiritual experience. This experience is central to all the religions of the world. Some call it fellowship with God; others say it is an experience which cannot be described in terms of finite categories and human speech. It is called mysticism, unitive life, *Brahman*-realization, etc. It transcends as well as transforms the apparent individuality of the finite self. Those who have this intense spiritual experience do not stop with that. They endeavour to effect that desirable change in society which would help to remove the hindrances which prevent men from realizing this religious experience. Religious experience, not the creedal knowledge of religion, makes one realize the fundamental unity of things and selves. It is an integral experience. It is not mere imagination, for it is the apprehension of a reality by a valid form of consciousness. God is the factual content of the religious experience. "To the mystic God is as much a Reality as the leaf is to the Botanist."

Religion brings out the central truth that man does not live entirely for himself or entirely for the community. It brings out the unique harmony between the persistent claims of the individual and of the community. It vindicates the sacredness of the individual, which is in per-

[2] *The Republic*, VIII. 544 (Jowett's translation).

[3] The philosophy of the *Gita* and the *Īśa Upaniṣad* (vv. 1,2) are eloquent affirmations of the view.

petual jeopardy today. The sages of the Upaniṣads, who were scholar-seers, declare with one voice that there is no greater verity than the Individual. The individual, i.e. the Spirit in the Body, is the most valuable thing in human life, and not what happens on a battlefield or in the clash of politics or in the regimented movement of men towards "standards of living."

Religion alone can define and reveal the proper worth of the individual and thus put an end to the rule of tyrants who have systematically suppressed liberty. Standardization of culture, systematic suppression of any opinion contrary to the government, militant nationalism, supreme faith in armaments, rule by revelation, and governance by guile are the characteristic features of our age, which can only be remedied by a sound religion.

There are some who say that we can replace religion by poetry, art, and literature. These no doubt ennoble the mind of man, but they can never take the place of religion. It is religion that puts each thing in its proper place and thus renders life an ordered whole. Art and literature do not carry with them the universal certitude of that great experience which is central to religion. Poetry and art cannot by themselves save the soul. Religion alone can. In the words of the learned Professor D. S. Sarma:

> Poetry and art only reveal the antinomies of emotion, while religion tries to transcend them. Poetry conserves all apparent individual values and religion surrenders them all at the feet of God. Art, poetry and music revel in the rainbow colours of creation. Religion seeks the pure white radiance of eternity. Literature and music move and live among the many. Religion transcends and transforms life into one glorious experience.[4]

Religion is the most cherished possession of humanity. It has an autonomy of its own. It has to be carefully marked out from the invasion of secular and political thought. It is not a set of dogmas, it is a unique spiritual experience.[5]

Some point out that there are men who are not able to experience the religious feelings. This is no argument against religion. "Of the most significant pleasurable experiences of life only the simplest are opened to all indiscriminately." The rest cannot be experienced without sufficient and suitable training. The dimension called religion must be developed with endeavour. It is the men of religious experience "that have stamped infinity on the thought and life of the country," and they have added to the invisible forces of goodness in this world. They declare in the perfect accent of finality the reality of the spirit. They ask

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[4] D. S. Sarma: *How It Strikes a Hindu*, the essay on "Poetry As Religion." The article appeared originally in THE ARYAN PATH.

[5] See the excellent book *The Modern Predicament* by H. J. Paton.

us to give up violence and work for peace. Let us work hard for the betterment of this grand vineyard of which we are gardeners. The call of religion is, in short, to defend reason, affirm the values of life, return to philosophy, and establish peace and concord on earth.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

GOD

A God that creates
Is too real to be God;
Too understandable.
My God is ineffable, unfathomable;
That which creates
The act of creation,
The act of understanding.
My God is a not-God,

A not-reality;
That which subserves reality,
Makes it possible,
And fires it.

My God is me-ness without thou-ness,
Self without other;
Without relationship.
That which I am not,
And do not wish to be.
I am he.

VIVIAN WORTHINGTON

THE JAINA TRADITION IN MODERN EYES

[**Shri M. A. Venkata Rao** sketches briefly the dangerous atmosphere of some widely held modern views of the nature of human consciousness, and argues that the simple but firmly self-reliant ethics which flow from the Jaina philosophy would be of great value in inducing respect for life and respect for the human being in our day.—Ed.]

In the present crisis of civilization Jainism has a distinct role to play in current Indian society (and abroad also if its message spreads) since its tradition, in addition to being a power among its adherents (much more so than Buddhism in India) has many features that appeal to the modern rational mind.

Western psychology began with the ancient Greeks as a science of the soul. In modern times the new physics and its methods were applied to mental life. Psychologists found that it was not necessary to assume any soul-substance to account for mental phenomena — thought, imagination, emotion, conation, goal-seeking, etc. They were content with the assumption of a mind as distinguished from the body and the physiological structures and occurrences therein. Soon enough, the argument about the superfluity of soul-substance was found to apply to mind-substance as well, and so the mind as an entity was also dropped by psychologists. The series of states of consciousness (the stream of consciousness) was studied only as a continuity. In India, this corresponds to the schools of Buddhism which believe in mind as a flow of *skandhas* — thoughts, feelings, and conations — continuous but without unity. The self as a unitary substance is on this view nothing but an illusion.

This is the prevalent view in the West of the nature of mind and selfhood. It has become the inspiration of much art and literature which use the stream of consciousness as their major *motif*, with the stress on wide panoramic views of life more than on plan and fulfilment. James Joyce and Virginia Woolf are typical examples. The attempt to seek significance in life is abandoned. With this are naturally associated the schools of painting that emphasize appearance to the eye more than meanings or symbols: lines, dots, patches, colours, for their own sakes.

A further step was taken when even consciousness was abandoned and external behaviour was regarded as sufficient to explain all mental experience. Inwardness was given up. Behaviourism looks upon the body as a chain of complicated stimuli-responses, of conditioned reflexes. Thought is resolved into vocal manipulations and sound productions! If a monkey were given a typewriter and endless time, it has been said, it could reproduce *Hamlet* some day by sheer chance, if it continued typing long enough.

Also, living beings including humans could be made to learn any trick, like dogs and monkeys, as Dr. Pavlov showed, if proper stimuli (hunger, fear, etc.) were remorselessly applied. We find a fearful application of these so-called psychological methods along with hypnotic and psychoanalytical techniques by the ruling *élites* of Russia and China to their huge populations to control their behaviour in predetermined ways, fulfilling the dread prophecy of Orwell in his macabre book *Nineteen-eighty-four*.

In a word, "environmentalism" has run mad in the West and has dissolved the human soul and its individuality. Naturally the infinite value of freedom inherent in its nature has become a joke and communism is the resulting political doctrine. The West, like Dr. Frankenstein, has created a monster and the machine of its creation has killed its Soul.

In this inner atmosphere the Jainas, who preserve their traditional climate of thought and discipline, have a notable part to play in preserving the free soul of India and in helping the West itself to recover its great free soul.

The Jaina philosophy divides the universe into two major categories — *jīva* and *ajīva*, i.e., soul and matter. The soul is an entity that determines itself and its activities by its own ideal of its perfection. It is self-determined. The *ajīva*, on the other hand, is other-determined. It may be active and energetic, but such activities are initiated from outside and by no *purpose*. Matter consists of minute, subtle, atomic entities which aggregate themselves into the physical bodies that we come to know through our senses.

The soul is not thought of, as it is by the Buddhists, in terms of a series or stream of states. Nor is it lost in physical states. It is not a mere epiphenomenon or after-glow of the body's activity like the heat of an engine or its whistle or sound. It is a power which regulates itself.

It is *puruṣa*, spirit. It is *ātmā* or self. It is spirit in the sense that it is self-consciousness. Not in the trivial sense of self-awareness in ordinary life but in the metaphysical sense, popularized by Hegel, that it is a self or mental substance whose essential nature it is to be a self, a being which can say to itself, "I," which can determine its activities by self-chosen goals, which not only chooses its own goals and purposes but is aware and can become aware of itself in doing so. Its essence is "I"-ness or self-hood.

Of course, all souls in the universe are not found at this level of explicit self-consciousness. The universe is full of souls at all stages of development — from the stage hardly distinguishable from sheer unconsciousness, like matter, through intermediate beings of one, two, three, and four sense organs, to man with his five sense organs and mind or internal sense of memory and imagination. There may be higher beings in the cosmos.

The criterion in his classification is the level of explicit consciousness

or knowledge which reflects the Nature of the Universe or Truth in the mirror of their selves.

This is very much like the Leibnitzian Monad or spiritual entity, of which the universe is full. But Leibnitz did not recognize *ajīva* or matter as real. He thought of it as confused perception — the appearance that colonies of near-unconscious monads present to monads at the human level. Matter is therefore *māyā* or illusory appearance to Leibnitz. But the Jainas are more realistic and recognize the reality of matter or *ajīva,* made up of atomic particulars. Souls are found mixed up with aggregates of material particles at all levels from the minutest, ultra-microscopic, to macroscopic levels. To the Jaina every drop of water or pellet of mud is a colony of innumerable souls, enmeshed in material particles.

Though the founders of the system write of the souls as living beings (*jīva*), they hold that jivas are *conscious beings* in essence, though in their simpler incarnations in water, earth, fire, and air, they may not appear to be such. All life is pervaded by consciousness, and is capable of feeling pleasure and pain, of expanding or contracting in consequence, or rising or falling in the evolutionary scale. This is the origin of the famous Jaina doctrine and ethic of *ahimsa* or non-injury.

This is not foreign to current Western thought. Dr. Hans Driesch supported it in his theory of *entelechy* or individuality following Aristotle and Leibnitz. Dr. A. N. Whitehead supports the presence of conscious entities throughout the cosmos at all levels, even seemingly unconscious, as in so-called matter. There are panpsychists like Miss Calkins who resort to it to support their doctrine of Personalism.

Indeed, as a reaction against the materialist environmentalism of Marxists and others who lose sight of freedom and personality in their pursuit of Utopia, Personalism is coming into favour today as a philosophy defending the ultimate value of finite human individuality, of man as an end in himself, as a self-realizing being. Americans are re-studying Josiah Royce and Bowne and Howison in this light, and evincing interest in the Vedanta of Ramanuja and Madhva as safeguarding the values of personality better than the philosophies of *māyā,* Buddhist and Advaitin.

They will find Jainism freer from many of the logical and metaphysical puzzles and self-contradictions that beset the Vedantin philosophies. Pluralism and stress on values are characteristic notes of the modern renaissance of philosophy and ethics in may ways and Jainism will be found to satisfy these aspirations better than most traditional philosophies.

Henri Bergson and James Ward are two other modern philosophers who think of life and consciousness as co-eval throughout the depth and height of their presence in the infinite cosmos. The Jaina word *jiva* connotes this fusion of life and consciousness and their pervasion of the universe (or

rather "pluri-verse") in the form of souls. The pluri-verse from end to end of the infinite cosmos (from *Loka* to *aloka ākāśa*) is bursting with life, with germs, with souls. Browning says that man is a god though in germ. The Jaina thinker says that every germ is a god in the Becoming!

The pluri-verse is a "Vale of Soul-making," no doubt, in the phrase of Keats. But the Jaina thinker would add — the souls have to make or mar themselves by their own efforts. They are awfully alone with their immortal and infinite destiny in the infinite cosmos.

But in another sense, they are not alone. The Perfected Ones (*Siddhas*) of the past exist at the top of the universe as shining examples for bound souls to follow. The way that the elephant takes in the dense jungle becomes the more easily followed highroad to weaker creatures.

This is the Jaina worship. There are no creative gods or Creator God. The pluri-verse was not created and cannot be destroyed. It exists from everlasting to everlasting. It continually transforms itself in its attributes but continues its substantial essence or nature. Worship is contemplation of the Perfected Ones with devoutness and desire to become like them. Worship, says Dr. Whitehead, is surrender to the claim for assimilation. Perfection claims assimilation. Perfection is also a profoundly humanistic ideal in Jainism and consists in infinite knowledge, infinite joy, and infinite power (all perfect without the tainting touch of matter), the soul arriving at its purity or self-recovery (*ātmalābha*), *mokṣa* or *kaivalya* (liberation from the thraldom of matter). Such a soul is also in a state of perfect joy (*paramānandanimagnaḥ*) and compact of knowledge (*jñānamaya.*) There can be no more rational ideal for human beings than this of perfect knowledge and joy.

There is no revealed scripture in Jainism in the usual sense of a verbally infallible revelation from a supernatural source. Scriptures are the teachings of Perfected Teachers deriving their authority from their Truth. They prove themselves in practice if disciples follow the precepts laid down by the *āchāryas*. Intellectually, the disciples must understand the spirit of the *Triratnas* or Three Gems, viz., of Perfect Faith (or Attitude), Perfect Knowledge, and Perfect Conduct (*Samyak darśana, samyak jñāna, samyak chāritra*). Morally and spiritually, this means a life of discipline whereby we consciously avoid giving pain to the creatures of which the universe is full. All virtues are forms of *ahiṃsā* or non-injury in specific circumstances.

The soul is hemmed in by a mountain of matter. It should liberate itself by lessening the activities that bind it to the world of matter. Hence the asceticism of the Jainas.

The householder, the lay person, is offered a practical chart of life whereby he can gradually ascend the Mountain of Liberation and attain

mokṣa. Meanwhile, his life in the world will have social virtues. Here the Jaina logic of the *nayas* or approaches to truth and *Syādvāda* or differential aspects of every truth will teach tolerance and understanding. The Jaina social ethics will teach mankind how to make persuasion preponderate over force, non-violence over violence, which is the supreme morality.

There is no supreme creator-God, dominating the universe inside and outside souls and matter. This safeguards the awful responsibility of the human individual in the cosmos. The Jaina theory of soul and individuality rescues the modern mind from being lost in false psychologies of environmentalism and guides it along the path of self-effort to self-realization, which is also the path of expanding social conscience and service.

These and many other aspects of the Jaina tradition, if understood and practised (more in spirit than in letter) will create the climate favourable to republicanism, inasmuch as the whole universe is itself a republic of sounds engaged in self-realization, eon after eon, in endless time and practically endless space.

M. A. Venkata Rao

SLEEP

Your touch is healing to the brow
Of one who seeks your lovely spell,
Your voice has magic cadences
That charm the soul from out the shell;
Who sees your calm mesmeric eyes
Feels life a dark dissolving dream
And floats as gently as a leaf
Upon enchantment's jewelled stream.

Herbert Bluen

POETRY AND THE SENSE OF TRADITION

[Our old and esteemed contributor, **Mr. Howard Sergeant,** is himself the author of various collections of poems and books of literary criticism, besides having edited various anthologies of modern poetry and an edition of *Selected Works of Milton*. He is at present the editor of *Outposts*. Readers will remember his articles in The Aryan Path on "The Nature of Meaning in Poetry: An English Approach" (April-May 1963) and "The Innovations of Gerard Manley Hopkins" (December 1964).—Ed.]

It is a curious feature of modern English poetry, if also a paradoxical one, that the work usually considered to have been the most revolutionary in its effect is that which, in certain respects, has been the most traditional. This is not so surprising as it might appear to readers who have accustomed themselves to think of modern poetry as a complete breakaway from the standards of the past. It might even be contended that nearly all the major changes in English poetry have been initiated by poets who were most deeply conscious of English or other national traditions. As T. S. Eliot has remarked,

> the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer, and within it the whole of the literature of his own country, has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order. This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal, and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional.

Eliot, the outstanding innovator of our own age, has, of course, always insisted upon his allegiance to tradition. The validity of his attitude would have been appreciated much earlier had it not been for the prevalent misconception of tradition as an entirely static force and, in particular, for its identification with the work of the Victorian poets. If it is true that every movement is, in origin, a reaction against the ideas and techniques of the preceding generation, it is also true that every new movement is a rediscovery of what has been lost, a re-emphasis upon what has temporarily been forgotten or neglected. And after every period of experimentation it becomes necessary to trace the various lines of development, to assimilate and interpret, and to assess the achievement in relation to the whole of literature.

The vast majority of the present-day reading public still regard modern poetry as being violently opposed to tradition. They tend to accept it, reject it, or — more often — treat it with supreme indifference, on what they assume to be its own inherent standards. On the one hand they place Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, Tennyson, and

perhaps even Rupert Brooke, and on the other, the moderns, Eliot, Pound, Auden, Thomas, etc. To some extent the reading habits of the general public have been conditioned by the popular newspapers and other publications specially designed for mass-appeal and persuasion. It is reported that the newspaper proprietor, Lord Northcliffe, once instructed his staff to keep it in mind that the mental age of their readers was fourteen; and many of our films and television programmes seem to be produced on the same basic principle. One cannot, therefore, expect any adequate response from a public nurtured on work so unconducive to the exercise of normal intelligence. In the case of the established "masters" the critical study has already been done for us, and at school we may have learned, if not to enjoy the poetry of earlier generations, at least to pay it lip-service.

It is questionable whether or not the ordinary reader, as distinct from the genuine lover of poetry, will ever truly appreciate the poetry of his own age until these mechanical habits of reading have been corrected. Fortunately, there are responsible teachers in children's schools, adult institutions and other educational centres, who realize the urgency of training students to develop those habits of mind by which they will be enabled to determine precisely what their responses are. Mature reading is merely the coordination of such responses. Animated by this heightened awareness — what D. H. Lawrence called "the flexibility to know what he feels" — the individual will, consciously or unconsciously, endeavour to relate his reading both to his own experience and to the traditional values of the society in which he lives.

Nevertheless, contemporary critics must bear some responsibility for the existing state of confusion in regard to poetry. Despite the effort of Dr. Leavis and the Cambridge School in England, there is a tendency among critics to use terms loosely and inconsistently. The words "traditional" and "original" are two such terms. For one critic to describe a collection of poems as "traditional" might be to suggest that the work has merit solely because the author has chosen to apply established forms and rhyme-patterns, and has expressed himself in a simple, straightforward manner. Another critic, perhaps more favourably disposed to verbal intricacies, rough textures or metaphysical speculation, might use the same term in disparagement to imply that the poet in question had nothing of his own to communicate, having relied upon the ideas and techniques of earlier poets to disguise his mediocrity. Similarly, for a poet to be described as "original" might mean either that he has failed as a poet but possesses certain qualities of intellect with which he succeeds in dazzling his readers or, alternatively, that his poetry is of a high standard. The precise sense intended is not always easy to determine. One can refer to the name of the writer of the article if one is familiar with the different at-

titudes of the various schools of critical thought and can identify the writer with a particular group; but not all readers are so well acquainted with the ideologies of the literary world. These remarks do not, of course, have any application to our best critics who, usually, are careful to define their terms or to indicate in the context the specific sense in which they are being used.

It should be obvious that no poet today can be completely original in the sense that his work owes nothing to the poetry of his own or any other time. The poet's originality consists in his creative power to extend, develop or change the tradition in some individual way as the result of his technical craftsmanship and/or his personal experience and understanding of life. Unless he has an individual mode of apprehension, whether it be of social problems, or natural phenomena, or of matters largely relating to the individual, he cannot become a poet of real significance. The basic elements of poetry are language and the whole psychological experience of the poet. Those critics and writers who intermittently are discovering signs of a reversion to older forms and attitudes are therefore indulging in a little wishful thinking. The traditions are safely in the hands of the leading contemporary poets. If there is any evidence of a renewed preoccupation with lyrical poetry, the result will be a different type of lyricism from anything known before, if only for the reason that the poet must bring his psychological experience to his work, and his experience must, of necessity, be different from that of any earlier poet.

A study of the courses of direction in English poetry during the last fifty years reveals that, in addition to the channels shaped by the new creative forces in operation, there has also been the re-emergence of certain powerful currents which were apparent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (i.e., in the work of the Elizabethan dramatists and the later metaphysical poets). Hopkins's experiments with Sprung Rhythm were, one might say, the individual systematization of practices adopted by several poets, principally Langland, Skelton and Milton (in "Samson Agonistes"); and perhaps nowhere so clearly in evidence as in another rich sphere of tradition — the English nursery rhymes. And in their preoccupation with these currents of the tradition which had been flowing underground, so to speak, both Eliot and Hopkins have exerted a tremendous influence upon the poets of the period. This is not to imply that the innovating poets have merely copied an established method or introduced a modernized version. Each has created a unique style by achieving a synthesis out of personal or local and traditional values.

Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt

Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of impression of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion.... (T. S. Eliot: *Four Quartets*)

The real poet, then, will not hesitate to take what he needs from the tradition for his purposes; yet he achieves something more than a mere imitation of what has been done by his predecessors — he restores and revivifies the tradition and extends its validity to his own time. "Each new venture is a new beginning." What is borrowed from the past is invested in the new work of art, and the debt repaid with interest. In the lines which follow the above quotation, Eliot stresses the essential difficulties of the task — "There is only the fight to recover what has been lost and found and lost again and again" — but the fight is a different one for each poet because the battle must be carried into new areas and individual advance-posts established. It is not sufficient for the positions to be held, though the defenders may serve a useful purpose in maintaining what has already been won. For the poet must live in his own age and be aware of its problems and conflicts. Indeed, there can be no proper apprehension of the past without an immediate knowledge of the present.

The growth of a nation's culture — because it must be an organic growth if it is to be rooted firmly in the lives of the people — is normally a slow process taking place through centuries. There are exceptions, of course, notably in the countries making up the Commonwealth. India has one of the oldest cultures of all. But however old the traditions, it should be remembered that few nations have ever succeeded in developing a culture entirely from native elements; certainly not the English, whose literature has been enriched for centuries by European and other influences. The Bible alone has exercised an incalculable effect upon English literature; and this can probably be paralleled in India by even older religious and mythological works. In the culture of almost every civilized nation, two elements can be clearly distinguished — the indigenous or regional, and the foreign or cosmopolitan. The former being concerned with environmental values and expressing the distinctive qualities of the nation's outlook and manner of life, though adapted to the experience of the individual; the latter making its impact through translations and imported works of art. The two may be complementary to each other or in conflict at any particular time, but gradually merge into the histori-

cal tradition.

Perhaps the only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty, however, is that whatever poetic tradition emerges, it will reflect the historical, racial and social patterns of the nation concerned, and that the individual poets of the nation will develop the forms of expression most appropriate to their needs. For instance, since slavery has played so large a part in the history of the British West Indies, it is not surprising to find the young West Indian poet, Derek Walcott, writing a verse drama about a negro slave who became king of Haiti (*Henry Christophe*) or a poem on the "Ruin of a Great House," once the possession of a slave-owner. Similarly, in the light of events which followed closely upon the granting of independence to India, we can hardly wonder that the Pakistani poet, Zulfikar Ghose, should be so concerned with the immediate effects of the Partition as to feel, temporarily at least, almost a stranger in his country:

> India halted: as suddenly as a dog,
> Barking, hangs out his tongue, stifles his cry.
> An epic turned into a monologue
> Of death. The rope lay stiff across the country;
> All fires were eaten, swallowed all the swords;
> The horizon paled, then thickened, blackened with crows.
>
> Born to this continent, all was mine
> To pluck and taste: pomegranates to purple
> My tongue and chillies to burn my mouth. Stones
> Were there to kick. This landscape, these people —
> Bound by the rope and consumed by their own fire.
> Born here, among these people, I was a stranger.
>
> ("This Landscape, These People")

Or that the young Indian poet, Dom Moraes, should be equally concerned with the Tibetan frontier:

> History and winter re-enact a rite.
> Time will not ever speak to us, but flies
> As message to our eyes, the first snow falls.
>
> The invaders walk under the eaves of night,
> Leading their mules, their slanted foreign eyes
> Following a star above our waterfalls.
>
> ("The Frontier — Sikkim-Tibet 1959")

Whether or not such work will be significant enough to disturb the "whole existing order," to quote Eliot once more, and "readjust the values of each work of art towards the whole," yet remains to be seen.

HOWARD SERGEANT

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

A SCIENTIST AND A PRIEST *

I dare not speak about the man Jesus. I do not feel equal to that task. But I owe it to you to make my personal position clear. I am a Christian, or I should rather say: I try to be a Christian. This is not a traditionalist's position. I have even found much of the Christian tradition, both in thought and in life, difficult to understand, and some of it impossible to follow. But . . . I have been hit by the word of Christ. In a way this word has made life impossible to me; the life I might have lived without it has been destroyed by it. In a way it has made life possible to me; I am not certain whether I would have found a possible way of life without it at all.

THESE WORDS, which in essential parallel may be found at any point down the Christian ages, were not written by a theologian but by a renowned physicist-philosopher, Carl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, in the first series of his Gifford Lectures 1959-60 entitled *The Relevance of Science*. So it is more than coincidence that the back wrapper should be used to draw attention to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man*, of which a reviewer said: "He has created a synthesis of evolutionary science and religious doctrine that has the lucidity and sweep of Aquinas' *Summa Theologica*."

It is pleasant to contemplate the scientist embarking on the seas of theology and the priest essaying the straits of science, and none the less pleasant because unfamiliar in days in which, as Weizsäcker acknowledges, religious agnosticism is probably the dominant attitude of the Western mind. To assist and deepen contemplation Collins have also published the translation of a fourth of de Chardin's books, *The Future of Man*. This, a collection of papers dealing with aspects of the common theme, and arranged in chronological order, the publisher claims to be in many ways the key to the whole thought of de Chardin.

In one of the longer papers, entitled "The Grand Option," he argues that we have come to a point when mankind seems to be approaching the critical point of social organization. If we are to continue to exist we must undergo such transformation as will forge our multiplicity into a whole. It is a problem not of organization but of values. Various courses are open, one back and three forward, and to decide which is the best to follow is the grand option. We cannot turn back. History points to the inevitability of the forward march of the universe. This means that

> individual acts are bound to follow, *in the majority and freely*, the sole direction capable of satisfying all their aspirations towards every imaginable form of higher consciousness. Having been initially the fundamental choice of the individual, the Grand Option, that which decides in favour of a convergent Universe, is destined sooner or later to become the *common choice* of the mass of Mankind . . . a "conspiracy" in terms of perspective and intention.

It is the hope of the early establishment on earth of a new environment of action that constitutes the greatness of the present moment of man's history.

Alas, that argument was penned in March 1939! Writing in the fifties, a whole world later, Weizsäcker is concerned to engage in dialogue with those

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* *The Relevance of Science: Creation and Cosmogony*. By C. F. VON WEIZSACKER. Gifford Lectures 1959-60. (192 pp. 25s.); *The Future of Man*. By PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN. Translated from the French by NORMAN DENNY. (319 pp. 30s.) (Both Collins, London. 1964.)

who sense the dangerous ambivalence of contemporary scientific civilization, and in order to make sense of the present he has to look more backward than forward. Indeed the ten lectures of the first series are almost wholly historical. The over-all concern is with the *truth* of science; with that which is the presupposition of its relevance — its meaning, limitations, and possible ambiguities.

There is a believing trust in science ("scientism") which today is assuming much of the role played by religious faith in earlier ages. But is it a true view of life? There is good reason to use the word "ambiguity" in regard to the achievements of science. And the meaning of scientism is no less ambiguous than the effect of science. We may ask of science *qua* religion: What does it know about God; about man? Weizsäcker postpones an answer to the first part of the question until the conclusion of the study of historic religions contained in the lectures. The second part needs no such preparation. The scientist who offers to explain human nature is at least far ahead of his time!

> But the key we seem to have lost is just the key to human nature. Religion has at all times claimed to possess this key. Even the agnostic who doubts the claim as raised by religion will probably have to admit that it would be vital for us to have an adequate understanding of human nature. All [our] troubles . . . do not arise out of an insufficient mastery of the powers of the physical world; they arise out of our inability to conduct, to predict or even to understand the actions of human beings . . . scientism, if it rests its trust on the expectation that science by its own nature is enabled to give us sufficient guidance in human affairs, is a false religion. Its faith, if going so far, is superstition; the role of the priest does not become the scientist, and good scientists know that; the scientific code of behaviour needs a background of an ethics which science has not been able to provide.

How then has science come to play this ambiguous role? This is the question answered in the bulk of the lectures which make up an account of the historical origin of scientism, limited to and illustrated by the problem of the relationship between the two concepts of "creation" and "cosmogony."

Weizsäcker is concerned to diagnose the ambivalence. He defines diagnosis as a theoretical piece of work with a practical goal — the hope of therapy. But, at least in this series of lectures, no therapy is provided for the dangerous sufferings of the modern world. It is a contribution toward diagnosis. Can our other author add the positive note? Does the role of scientist become the priest? It must not be deduced from the quotation above that de Chardin was a blind optimist. He was certain that there must be change, but it might be for the worse. In 1952 he wrote:

> For all his discoveries and inventions, twentieth-century man is a sad creature. How shall we account for his present dejected state except basically by the fact that, following that exalted vision of species in growth, he is now confronted by an accumulation of scientific evidence pointing to the reverse — the species doomed to extinction?

How are we to exorcize this shadow? De Chardin argues that what does most discredit to faith in progress is the unhappy tendency to destroy everything most valid and noble in expectation of some form of a Golden Age. As if all Evolution has in store for us is a period of euphoria and abundance! What matters is not well-being but a hunger for more-being.

> It is upon its point . . . of spiritual concentration, and not on its basis . . . of material arrangement, that the equilibrium of Mankind biologically depends.

This latest book demonstrates even more strongly that unity of religious vision and scientific vision which informed all de Chardin's life and work. He too was hit by the word of Christ. Nowhere has this been made more clear than in the tiny note penned on the last page of his journal three days before he died in 1955. The dominant note

"God shall be all in all" appears also in a luminous note on "The End of the World" which will command the assent of many who cannot wholly share the faith of this Catholic priest:

> Like a vast tide the Being will have dominated the trembling of all beings. The extraordinary adventure of the World will have ended in the bosom of a tranquil ocean, of which, however, each drop will still be conscious of being itself.

If Weizsäcker grapples with the problem of whether there was any God in the beginning, de Chardin draws from his deep knowledge of creation the certainty that in the end is God.

MARCUS WARD

Frontiers of Science and Philosophy. Edited by ROBERT G. COLODNY. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 288 pp. 1964. 28*s*.)

This is a collection of six lectures originally given in 1960 on the initiative of Vice-Chancellor Charles Peake of Pittsburg University, who was then sponsoring an annual series of lectures by noted philosophers of science.

This is in no sense a book on "popular science," nor does it attempt to interpret for the layman the new concepts and theories resulting from the ever accelerating rate of advance in so many of the sciences. Rather it is a critical analysis of the very thinking that gave rise to the new concepts themselves.

The arguments run deep and are not easy to follow, but the dedicated reader may be rewarded by an enhanced critical ability though he will find naught for his soul's comfort.

The first of the lectures is by Carl Hempel, "Explanation in Science and History." Here the two basic types of "explanation," the deductive-nomological and the probabilistic, are investigated and the conclusion reached that the nature of understanding is fundamentally the same in all areas of scientific and historical inquiry.

The second is by Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man." The two differing images of man, the manifest and the scientific, are explored and the three lines of thought criticized:

1. Manifest objects are identical with systems of imperceptible particles.

2. Manifest objects are what "really" exist; imperceptible particles being symbolic ways of representing them.

3. Manifest objects are only appearances to human minds of a reality made up of systems of imperceptible particles.

Whatever view is taken, there is no doubt that man's image of himself will profoundly affect what in fact he becomes.

The third is by Michael Scriven, "Frontiers of Psychology." Psychoanalysis and Parapsychology are analysed and the conclusion reached that the first provides us with a great theory without a factual foundation and the second with a factual basis on which a theory has yet to be built. An attempt is made to resolve the paradox of determinism and free will and the "Predictor-and-Avoider" problem investigated. The reader may feel that he is still unable to square the circle.

The fourth, by Ernst Caspari, discusses the conceptual basis of the biological sciences. The "order-analytical" and the "causal-analytical" methods of physical, psychological, and common-sense time are examined. The anisotropy of physical time has its counterpart in the unidirectional flow of psychological time, though the author does not see them as identities. He concludes that, like most deep problems, that of time confronts us with many unanswered questions.

And lastly, P. K. Feyerabend deals with the "Problems of Microphysics." Here the "Copenhagen interpretation" of the wave-particle duality and the

principle of complementarity is criticized and the view that any conceivable future theory of the universe must necessarily contain uncertainty relations and the constancy of "h" is opposed.

H. READ

The Tiger's Cave: Translations of Japanese Zen Texts. By TREVOR LEGGETT. (Rider and Company, London. 191 pp. Illustrated. 1964. 25*s*.)

This volume is certainly to be welcomed. It combines authenticity (Japanese writings, not a mere interpretation for the West) with approachability. Together the contrasting texts build a portrait of Zen life.

Abbot Obora of the Soto sect contributes the major item, a commentary on the *Heart Sutra* with its radiant 264 words, featuring the Bodhisattva Kannon (*kan* = "seeing"). The exposition is both profound and — where need be — realistic and homely.

> The whole body is like a mouth, hanging in emptiness, Not asking whether the breeze be from north or south, east or west. . . .
>
> From the state of Emptiness, each man's body is a body pervading the universe. . . .

Yet these teachings are lightened by typical illustrations and tales of masters and disciples.

This revealing personal note is heightened in the autobiographical piece, *Yasenkanna,* by the master Hakuin; one can intuit the varied personalities — poet, monk, teacher — of this beloved rejuvenator of eighteenth-century Zen. Harmonizing the vital currents in his body was the lesson taught him by a mountain "Sennin": the essence being to take down the heart-fire and keep it "at the Tanden [below the navel] and down to the soles. . . ." This physical approach is extended in the Appendix, which deals (probably for the first time) with physiological conditions during meditation and ecstasy, of both the Kundalini-Yoga and the Soto Zazen types. The results (drawn by Dr. Das and Professor Gastaut) are absorbing, though other researchers, as Professor Gastaut admits, have reached contrasting conclusions.

Preceding the Appendix come two brief, pregnant pieces ("The Sermon of No Words" and "Stillness in Action") by the present Soto Primate, Rosen Takashina.

"The Tiger's Cave" itself is one of several delightful parables and extracts, among which "The Lotus in the Mire," so tolerant towards prostitutes, and a description of the Dance of the Sennin or "free" mountain monks, are specially fascinating.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Buddhism in Japan. By E. DALE SAUNDERS. (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pa. 328 pp. 1964. $6.50)

In a small compass, Dale Saunders of the University of Pennsylvania has presented a comprehensive survey of the development of Buddhist ideas and sects in Japan. The book is a brilliant account, in clear and concise terms, of the growth of Mahayana ideas with an unmistakable impress of indigenous culture in that lovely and artistic island. After an introductory essay on the origins of Buddhism in India, the author narrates the interesting story of how Buddhist worship was brought to Japan through Korea about A.D. 552, and how the prince Shotuku was instrumental in the spread of this religion. The book presents outlines of the major sects such as Tendai, Shingon, Jodo Shinshu, Zen, Soto, and Rinzai. It brings out in bold relief the contributions of great Buddhist monks in Japan like Kobo Daishi, Honen, Shinran, Rennyo, Liuchi, Eisai, and Dogen. The book also attempts to explain the Mandala sym-

bolism, the Bodhisattva idea, meditational mysticism, and iconographical peculiarities.

The author's unfamiliarity with Sanskrit, however, has led him to several errors in rendering Indian words: examples are: "one who makes distinctions" for *Vibhajjavadin* (analyst) on p. 34; "dictator" for *guru* (preceptor) on p. 49; "predisposition" for *samskāra* (confections) on p. 56; and "fully enlightened one" for *arhat* (worthy one) on p. 86. While dealing with the life of the Buddha, the author mentions that the Buddha passed away in the month of Kārtika (p. 30), but the traditional month is Vaiśākha. The author seems to believe that Ashoka erected only pillars (p. 31); more numerous than pillars and more important than them, however, were the rock-edicts. Barring a few inaccuracies like these, the book is a very readable and reliable account of Japanese Buddhism.

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

The Nasirean Ethics. By NASIR AD-DIN TUSI. Translated from the Persian by G. M. WICKENS. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 352 pp. 1964. 45*s*.)

The author of this book, who died in A.D. 1274, was at one time associated with the Ismā'īlis and later was in the service of Hulāgu, the Mongol. He was well known for his writings on philosophy, ethics, and astronomy, and he also wrote a treatise on Ṣūfism. His acceptance of mysticism is apparent in this book. It has been described as "the best known ethical digest" of medieval Islam. The author had made a thorough study of Hellenic literature, as well as of preceding Islamic writers on philosophy and theology.

The book contains three Discourses. In the first, on Ethics, the Human Soul, of which the body is only the tool and instrument, is urged to aim at its perfection, by knowledge of the True Quest and Universal Goal, which means self-discipline and the acquirement of virtues. So the seeker becomes one of God's Saints and advances towards the attainment of the greatest felicity, union with the One Reality.

The second Discourse deals with Economics and the third with Politics. This includes an interesting section on Love. The author holds that when the soul is filled with pure love of the Divine, it is occupied in the contemplation of God, the Divine Illumination is shed upon it, and it attains to Union with the One.

This book, translated from a difficult Persian text by Professor Wickens of Toronto University, was prepared for the Persian Translations section of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It will be of great interest to all students of medieval philosophy.

MARGARET SMITH

Gandhi: His Relevance for Our Times. A Volume of Contemporary Studies in Gandhian Themes presented to Shri R. R. Diwakar on His Seventieth Birthday by the Workers of the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi. Edited by G. RAMACHANDRAN and T. K. MAHADEVAN. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 355 pp. 1964. Rs. 10.00)

In a world torn by violent conflicts and living under the menace posed by nuclear weapons, Gandhi's life and message have come to acquire a new significance and vitality. His ideas and strategy have, therefore, become the subjects of earnest and careful study by those eager to find an alternative to violence and war in resolving social and international conflicts. They are already being effectively applied in different parts of the world, notably in the U.S.A. by the Negroes for the

securing of civil rights.

The present volume is an impressive collection of thirty-five articles, over two-thirds of them being contributions full of thought and experience from American and European thinkers and crusaders for peace.

> Even if one thinks the chances of non-violent action turning out to be an effective substitute for war are very small [writes Gene Sharp in the article on "Gandhi's Political Significance Today"], the desperate nature of our situation is such that even such a small chance deserves full investigation.

Joan V. Bondurant makes an admirable analysis of *Satyāgraha,* and of *Durāgraha,* to which so-called *Satyāgraha* often degenerates, and concludes, "The methods must be refined and techniques developed for this age of advanced technology."

"Gandhi's Illustrious Antecedents" by Esmé Wynne-Tyson is a learned résumé of the contributions of philosophers who propounded non-violence, from Pythagoras down to our own times, while "Aspects of Non-violence in American Culture" by Mulford Q. Sibley gives such a résumé in respect of America.

There are interesting accounts of the use of non-violent methods in recent times in A. J. Muste's "Non-violence and Mississippi," Robert Miller's "Experimentation in Non-violence," Bradford Lyttle's "The Story of an Experiment with Truth," and Charles C. Walker's "The Impact of Gandhi on the U. S. Peace Movement."

Marie Beuzeville Byles speaks touchingly of her "weekly tonic of *Harijan* [Gandhiji's weekly] in "Gandhi Through the Eyes of the Gita" and shows a profound understanding of both Gandhi and the *Gītā* doctrine of *Karma Yoga* in her luminous article. "The Ark — A Gandhian Brotherhood in the West" by Simone Panter-Brick gives a very interesting account of Lanza del Vasto's Gandhian *āshram* in France. J. B. Kripalani, K. M. Munshi, K. Santhanam, B. Shiva Rao, and Raghavan N. Iyer are among the Indian contributors who write with a personal touch on Gandhi's life and work.

The volume opens with a well-merited tribute to Shri R. R. Diwakar by G. Ramachandran.

The volume is a noteworthy accession to the literature bearing on Gandhi and the dialectics and the practice of non-violence.

K. Sampathgiri Rao

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume. Edited by B. L. Atreya *et al.* (Darshana International, Moradabad. 600 pp. 1964. Rs. 30.00; £2 10*s.*; $8.00)

Hardly any honour, either as scholar or as statesman, remains for our erudite President, Dr. Radhakrishnan, yet to achieve. Doctorates awarded to him in almost every known faculty are legion. As Professor his activity was not confined to Indian Universities. He is the first Asian to have occupied the Chair of Eastern Religions at Oxford. He is respected throughout the world as a deep thinker, a gifted orator, and a fascinating author. As a statesman he occupies the highest office that is in the gift of the Indian people. In him India has realized the Platonic ideal of the Philosopher-King.

Nor does this seem to be the first time when a *Festschrift* has been presented to our President. The present Volume can therefore be no more than a tribute to a great philosopher by his *confrères* in India and abroad. Of the 77 articles it contains, the majority (41) are contributed by Americans and 22 by Indians. The remaining 14 are contributed by Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, and the West Indies. The contents of a compendium like this are necessarily of varying merit. Even a bare list of the more important articles is impossible in a brief review like this.

The mention of a few of them now at random should not be construed as a reflection on the merit of the others.

The Volume opens with a eulogistic article by B. L. Atreya, the Chief Editor of the Volume, maintaining that the President is endowed with all the blessings known to Indian tradition. Roberto Assagioli (Florence) enumerates the "specific points that characterize Psycho-synthesis." Albert E. Avey (Wooster) would like us to "retain a touch of scepticism" while reading the familiar accounts of early Greek thought. Joseph H. Bunzel (Virginia) indicates the philosophical concept underlying our artistic expression. G. E. Cairns (Florida) points out the agreement in ethical values in the philosophies of Morris Raphael Cohen, Fung Yu-lan, and Aurobindo. A. C. Ewing (Cambridge) discusses the relation between the State and the rights of the individual. Notwithstanding the publication of a number of books on Hindu ethics since 1922, A. R. Wadia (Bombay) still wonders whether there is any ethics at all in India in the sense in which the term is understood in Western Philosophy. "*Actualité de la Déclaration des droits de l'homme*" by Louis Lachance (Montreal) is the only French article in the Volume. Among other papers of interest here may be mentioned "Naturalism in Recent Indian Philosophy" by S. P. Kanal (Delhi), "Reflections on Comparative Philosophy" by Dale Riepe (Buffalo), "Indian Arguments about the Existence of God" by Ninian Smart (Birmingham), and "Indian Thought and Humanistic Psychology" by Henry Winthrop (Florida).

It is a matter for some regret that adequate care has not been taken in the printing and binding of a Volume like this, so rich in precious papers.

H. G. NARAHARI

Bible Translation in India, Pakistan and Ceylon. By J. S. M. HOOPER. Second Edition Revised by W. J. CULSHAW. (Oxford University Press, Indian Branch, Bombay. 226 pp. 1963. Rs. 6.00; Limp ed., Rs. 4.00)

"How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of him that bringeth forth good tidings, that publisheth peace." In these poetic words King David expressed the beauty of the messenger of good news. The Bible contains the story of the good news, the story of the love of God, of his dealings with man, and his love expressed in flesh in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. The Bible is the most widely read book in the world. Complete portions of it have been translated and published in some 1,216 languages of the world.

For fifteen years general secretary of the Bible Society in India, J. S. M. Hooper had had the unique opportunity of studying the work of translation and publication of the book into the languages and dialects of undivided India and Ceylon.

According to the 1951 Census Report, 14 languages — Hindi, Urdu, Panjabi, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Malayalam, Oriya, Assamese, Kashmiri, and Sanskrit — account for the mother tongue of just over 90 per cent of India's population. With the exception of Panjabi, the whole of the Bible was available in all the above languages by 1860. Approximately 150 languages and dialects are spoken by 10 per cent of the population. The Bible has been translated into 130 of these languages and dialects, although a recent study revealed that only 60 of these are at present in circulation.

Hooper published his book on the story of Bible translation in 1938. In the next few years, political changes occurred in India and Ceylon which made it necessary to re-arrange and re-write some of the chapters. This task was undertaken by W. J. Culshaw. The second edition remains substantially the work of the original author. The book

is concerned chiefly with the origins of translations in various languages, and not so much with the subsequent versions.

The book is divided into seventeen chapters, each dealing with the story of the translation of the Bible into one of the major languages of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. The author has paid well-deserved tributes to the early missionaries of the eighteenth century who, in spite of opposition from several quarters, struggled to make the Bible available to the people of our lands. The stories of Bartholomew Ziegenbalg and William Carey are typical of the outstanding perseverance and heroism of early missionaries.

The book is valuable both for reference and for its inspirational content.

JOHN ANTONY

The Nature of Healing. By ARTHUR GUIRDHAM. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 181 pp. 1964. 28*s*.)

This is a book which deals with a difficult subject in a very balanced and humane manner. The author is a doctor and eminent psychiatrist who has gradually come to accept certain concepts of health and disease as a result of a wide practical experience with patients, orthodox colleagues, and less orthodox healers. His own essential humility and tolerance characterize his writing, and one feels, after putting down his book, that he knows much of the art of healing at first hand.

The book deals with the natural gift of healing, and includes a detailed study of several cases with which the author was associated, together with a comparison of the characters and methods of the healers. Dr. Guirdham believes that healing of this type involves communication of healer and patient on a plane that is outside space and time, where contact with cosmic forces takes place; he stresses strongly the almost unconscious nature of this process, and also the need to consider a human being as a whole. The author is interested in religion, and contrasts natural healing with spiritual and faith healing; he also considers the healing work of Christ and the injunctions on this subject in the New Testament.

The author's English is occasionally inaccurate — for instance "a more indivisible wholeness" (p. 14) and a "more total approach" (p. 22) are clumsy phrases, and "is it to be surprised at" (p. 74) is somewhat unusual. These are small points, however, and the book can be warmly recommended to both medical and lay readers who are interested in the art of healing.

PHYLLIS G. CROFT

The Secret Places: Essays on Imaginative Work in English Teaching and on the Culture of the Child. By DAVID HOLBROOK. (Methuen and Company Ltd., London. xv+284 pp. Illustrated. 1964. 35*s*.)

Those who teach soon learn that it is as impossible to change the type of a pupil's brain as the colour of his eyes. It is comparatively easy to teach the academic type, revelling in "maths." and soaking in knowledge as a sponge takes water. David Holbrook devotes his book to the problem of helping the less gifted child to get the best possible out of "the continual contest to make what we can of living imperfectly with an imperfect nature, in an imperfect world."

He urges the value of self-expression in prose and in verse, and takes his title from the poem of a shy introspective girl who retreats to her "secret place." He quotes many writings, some undoubtedly self-revealing, and thus of great help to the teacher, but there is a danger of reading too much into children's stories, much of them echoed from

their experience of sensational TV.

> The problem in creative teaching is how to break the hold of cliché-ridden and sick type-themes so as to reach the more secret places of free and sincere exploration of experience.

Such teaching does not "bring 'results,' as exams do. But it is the way to make the nation articulate."

The chapter "The Child and Eros" is somewhat distasteful. In forty years' teaching experience I never found such sexual interest among boys and girls who were encouraged to engage in games and athletics rather than psychological self-expression, where, as he says, "the ground is delicate and dangerous, and we need to tread warily."

In a long discourse upon the writings of Bacon, Professor Knights, and Melanie Klein he comments that in our present society

> advances in happiness, personal fulfilment, or even in the effective use of our potentialities have not been equal with the material advantages.

He denies the value of text-book exercises and pleads: "Let them use their own well-chosen words by finding subjects that engage their natural imaginative energy."

While one hesitates to advise teachers to follow his methods entirely, one must say that the book gives some helpful ideas.

E. R. RANDALL

Sir Philip Sidney and the English Renaissance. By JOHN BUXTON. (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., London and New York. xi+284 pp. Second edition, 1964. 30*s*.)

To most people the Elizabethan period is the glamorous period of English literature, with Sir Philip Sidney a vague heroic figure in it. This book tries to see the Elizabethan poets as they saw themselves, and give patronage and Sir Philip Sidney their true importance. Mr. Buxton roundly challenges the clichés about the Armada and the New World, which are rampant today as they were when the first edition of this book appeared ten years ago. The real inspiration of English poetry, he reveals, is much more interesting. A vast amount of scholarship has gone into the writing, but it is never bewildering, for Mr. Buxton is the ideal teacher-companion, rousing and satisfying curiosity with perfect judgement, and never, never indulging in scholarly irrelevancies. There are fascinating snatches of Elizabethan writing on every page, as he demonstrates what determined hard work founded English poetry, and what gratitude and admiration the poets gave Sir Philip Sidney. One reaches the end with a new appreciation of the subtlety and skill of the "sonnets, songs, pastorals, elegies, epistles, narrative poems, odes, satires, posies, epigrams," which at first sound a mild pleasure to set against the great Romantics as is done here.

When it comes to interpretation, however, even Mr. Buxton has to resort to "Men's minds naturally turned . . ." and "Sidney must have felt. . . ." It is, of course, in the poems themselves that we must finally see the age alive. The entire absorption in the Elizabethan age here leads at times to an excessive admiration, and a certain amount of primness — "with these melancholy times we need have no concern" — which would not matter if it did not set the poets back again in a dream world, making it difficult to pass on to modern problems, which is another of Mr. Buxton's aims. He makes a real patron sound rarer than a great Romantic poet, and does not say just why he thinks a modern English poet is in a position "not unlike" the Elizabethan. It seems quite different. Sidney talks only of a *local* neglect of poetry. And since Sidney's personal charm can only be reported, not conveyed, we have no solid account of

why poetry rose from its despised position; and, since there are always small groups eagerly discussing and improving poetry, it is natural to fall back on the "disintegrated society" idea, which Mr. Buxton dislikes.

On the difference between the demands of poetry for a known purpose and the poetry of self-revelation, he is most stimulating. The atmosphere surrounding the poetry he describes, when a scholar in Vienna could write to England for an elegy in Welsh on a burnt book of Welsh history, reminds us that reviews, lectures, criticism, are too conscious and formal to offer the invaluable study of people as actual users of poetry, how it fits into individual life. Whether these users could form a "coherent, imaginable audience" is a question which brings us back again to the "disintegrated society."

ELIZABETH REUBEN

Bunga Emas: An Anthology of Contemporary Malaysian Literature (1930-1963) Edited by T. WIGNESAN. (Anthony Blond with Rayirath (Raybooks) Publications, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 272 pp. 1964. 25*s*.)

It is something of an adventure to meet with specimens of prose and poetry from a newly formed, developing state. Yet one's first reaction to *Bunga Emas* ("tribute") is perplexity. The movements of races, the welding of countries, the variety of communities and languages, among those who are now "Malaysian nationals" tell at once against any common outlook or (as yet) emergent aspiration or distinctive national style. We are told, dauntingly, that no "Malay writers" — which goes for both nationality and language — are included here. The contributors are all immigrants of Chinese or Tamil origin. Many of them, having attended the University of Malaya, write in English. The other authors have been translated, somewhat shakily, from Tamil and Chinese.

In a sense, then, these are all lone voices, learning sophistication from their European studies, but writing of simple communities in a land where a Western type of progress and development sits uneasily on Asian traditions. Some of the contributors localize these incompatibles. For instance, Lee Kok Liang, a practised story-writer, describes the diurnal scene in a half-modernized Malayan village with the faint horror and self-pride of one returning from an Australian education. All the tales are realistic, picturing home and school life, families crowded in huts or even caves, the force of superstitions and sarcasms, the bleak isolation of immigrants remembering their lost homes.

Of the poets represented, the best is Wong Phui Nam. In him a deep intensity of feeling struggles for utterance through ragged rhymeless stanzas in a vigorous English that is all his own if hardly orthodox. Two of the most effective prose pieces are translated from the original Chinese: Wei Yun poignantly describes the last days of a dying beggar "discarded" in the public marketplace; Miao Haiu has the rare gift of presenting a highly comic situation that merges into a tragic view of life.

Finally we must not underestimate the "professionalism" of these emergent writings. They are published in books and periodicals or broadcast on Radio Malaya, and their authors range from University lecturers and historians to teachers, journalists, newspaper editors, and "court interpreters." As the editor points out, they are young and face a promising future.

SYLVA NORMAN

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra** writes of what a true "Superman" might be: transcendent in compassion.—ED.]

I SOMETIMES THINK that the life of the story-teller or of one who writes about himself can be a fruitless pilgrimage. Obsessed by dreams, one knocks on several doors — one opening on travel in foreign lands, others on one's own childhood, the past, the world of society, the quest of love. These doors serve only to prolong the disappointments of a vain pursuit. I have wandered through empty rooms as in some chateau from which the Master is absent. One could die to one's own insignificance, like a mystic from whom the ultimate reward of ecstasy has been withheld.

Assailed by disenchantment, one finds, upon opening a window, that happiness is not something that lies outside a man but is contained within the mind. One feels that, deep in his being, the book one has to write lies waiting to be realized and so to flood one with happiness.

The arrival recently of an artist friend has made me reopen the whole problem of art and artists, and suggested an answer to many questions such as the relevance of this or that journey.

In so far as they are members of the fashionable world, the artists too are prey to the slow slipping into the banal, but to the extent to which they are creators they avoid the common destiny of their fellow men.

If artists have the power to endure, the reason is that they are blessed with the gift of transposing life into a series of equivalents. For the ordinary man dreams are drowned in reality. They, on the contrary, can so order matters that the reality which they have known becomes, to some extent, a dream. It matters little that they have come to terms with the trivial, with vanity, with stupidity; for they are alchemists who can transmute these things into gold.

Art often plunges its roots deep into what cannot openly be talked about, the backstage life of theatres, the squalid revelations of rooms where, inadvertently, the shutters have been left open, and it establishes far more contacts with vice. Vice may serve as the incentive which awakens genius, the demon which alone can set a protecting wall about its products. Vice does not orientate the individual to spiritual regeneration, but it may to artistic creativity. There is no question of repentance or conversion, no question of pardon or punishment in another world. It is possible for the artist to calm his conscience in this world, while that currency still retains its value, for the pain which others have suffered through one — in other words, pay by work, by creation. Atonement does not consist in withdrawing from this earth: on the contrary, it keeps on earth, brings back to earth, all those whom it affects. It ceases to have any meaning if one supposes that one day men will vanish from the face of the globe.

But certain optimists do believe that man as we know him will vanish from this earth. After all, they declare, there can never be a limit to man's development. Nietzsche spoke of the Superman; Aurobindo speaks like words; and, more recently, Teilhard de Chardin has taken up the refrain. In *The Future of Man,* he says:

> A new spirit is taking shape around us — the Soul of mankind resolved at all costs to achieve, in its total integrity, the uttermost fulfilment of its powers and its destiny.

It would be difficult not to agree with de Chardin; for Oriental traditions hold that the collective thoughts and actions coincide, as they do with saints and sages, a transformation is more quickly wrought; and all these thought-forces affect others, who are thus more liberated, because less confused. Ancient Indian thought speaks of the Golden Age, which, though part of a cyclic

order, is yet accelerated by individual effort. The world-order is altered because of the efforts of thousands upon thousands of liberated souls; even Aurobindo's own Integral Yoga has helped countless people.

But except perhaps in the case of Aurobindo and a few *karmayogins* and *karmayoginis* the effort to transform society has been left to individuals. This has been largely, till now, the Indian way, but the West has worked more collectively and de Chardin inclines the same way. He declares — and, I believe, with reason—

> that the entire complex of inter-human and inter-cosmic relations will become charged with an immediacy, an intimacy, and a realism such as has long been dreamed of and apprehended by certain spirits particularly endowed with the *sense of the universal* but which has never been *collectively applied.*

Teilhard de Chardin then goes on to say something which might correspond to the idea of *Karuna* and which he calls the power of sympathy. It will grow through the stages of *passive* sympathy — telepathy and more — to *active* sympathy, breaking out of its insulated state. "It will find its *heart,* without which the ultimate wholeness of its powers of unification can never be fully achieved." De Chardin does not want *a single freedom,* a single *moksha,* but a totality of freedom, freely operating.

De Chardin's theory is fascinating. It brings to mind the idea of the *heart,* as we find it in the *Kathopanishad* (II. 3.15): "When the *knots of the heart* are unloosened, then even here, in this human birth, the mortal becomes Immortal." The Buddha, too, in the *Surangama Sutra,* speaks of "the unloosening of the knots." I believe Teilhard de Chardin would accept this concept. I see no conflict in the man of realization helping others, working with them in this collective enterprise. It cannot be a new form of totalitarianism, but there can be an education in sympathy: once again, as the Guru or Teacher or psychologist would say, "an unloosening of the knots." And this could help usher in the Age of the Superman, where greater and greater sympathy, compassion for the less evolved, can spread increasingly around.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

In earlier centuries in Britain even a small theft carried the death penalty — at one time there were 240 such offences — but slowly the number has diminished. In 1948 the bill for its abolition did not get through the House of Lords, but the Homicide Act of 1957 reduced the categories of capital murder to five. Pressure became active again during 1964. In January appeared *A Calendar of Murder* by Terence Morris and Louis Blom-Cooper, a comprehensive survey of criminal homicide in England, 1957-62, with suggestions for more rational verdicts than the often anomalous legal definitions afforded. Other books have been Norman St.-John Stevas's paperback *The Right to Life,* and *The Homicide Act* by Christopher Hollis. The Longford Report was issued in mid-June, on the proposed general overhaul of the penal system, including the abolition of capital punishment. Public opinion has perhaps lagged behind, since the National Opinions Polls' questionnaire, November 1964,

showed little change from their previous survey of February 1962 (64 per cent "for" capital punishment, 22 per rent "against," and 14 per cent "don't know").

When Labour came into power in December, Mr. Sydney Silverman's bill to abolish capital punishment went through the Commons with 355 votes for and 170 against, and obstruction is not anticipated from the Lords. The chief concern is the alternative. Some people demand long-term imprisonment, as a deterrent and safeguard. Others declare a quick death preferable to this. At present "life sentence" means an indeterminate period, generally nine or ten years at the discretion of the Home Secretary. Recently, perhaps as a spur to the Home Office to take stronger measures against serious crime, judges have imposed much longer sentences than this for lesser crimes, and there is considerable tension and uncertainty between judiciary and executive.

In this general flux, the most hopeful sign is the greater recognition of prisoners' need for rehabilitation into society, and of the inadequacy of the prison medical service as regards psychiatric treatment. Apart from Grendon, Buckinghamshire, for selected prisoners, there are very few prisons where psychiatric therapy, including "group counselling" is undertaken, as in Wormwood Scrubbs, Holloway Women's Prison, and Wandsworth, all in London. However, at the end of December 1964 began the implementation of *The Organization of the Prison Medical Service,* a report published in April, and approved by both the previous and the present Home Secretary. One suggestion taken up was the appointment of eminent psychiatrists, dividing their work between a prison service establishment and a psychiatric hospital or clinic. Till now, prison doctors have generally had far too little experience of the psychological therapy obviously needed by prisoners instead of punitive or merely restrictive measures, that only lead to further deterioration of character. Even financially these are wasteful, since it is estimated that each man in prison costs annually £521 9*s.* 2*d.* The Longford Report has further humane suggestions, about bail, parole, and the expansion, in quality and quantity, of Family Service, probation, aftercare, and similar activities. It is hoped that 1965 will see some of these also put into action.

Mr. Barry Richards, former managing director of Vitbe Flour Mills, started the Helping Hand Organization early in 1964 with the object of linking together all the existing activities and organizations in Britain dealing with the wide-spread problem of alcoholism. This affects not only the 400,000 alcoholics themselves, but also some millions of people connected with them (*The Observer,* 13 December 1964). Industry loses between thirty and forty million pounds annually because of what is now more generally recognized as a disease. One convalescent centre for the rehabilitation of alcoholics has been opened in Camberwell, London, and plans are afoot for others in different parts of the country. A medical conference to interest industrialists is also projected.

The effect of alcoholism is so deadly to the victims and everyone connected that all efforts to overcome it must be welcome. It would be interesting to test whether the ideas of Eastern philosophy, of Shankaracharya's "Self and Not-self," with their emphasis on the real Self of man, as distinct from his vestures of body, senses, passions, etc., could give added strength to the battling will.

"Superstitions" have a talent for rising, phoenix-like, from the ashes to which scepticism has reduced them. Recently a few such have made a fresh appearance, with corroborative scientific evidence. The sea-serpent, and

similar monsters, long denied as a sailor's yarn, may still exist. Argument has raged for a few decades about the actuality of some such monster in Loch Ness, Scotland, having a small head on a long neck, and an elongated body that "humps" along the water, as a serpent's would do. A five-month expedition was organized by David James in the summer of 1964, and some of its findings are reported in *The Observer* (27 December 1964). The expedition was unfortunate in having few fine, calm days, favourable for the appearance and photography of the phenomenon, but sufficient "sightings" are recorded independently — by expedition members and other observers with satisfactory *bona fides* — to necessitate keeping a very open mind on the subject. David James includes reports of similar phenomena sighted in the salt-water Loch Linnhe, and also (by Moscow University geologists) in the Siberian Lake Haiyr. There is also an extract from the memoirs of an ex-Cabinet-Minister, in which he refers (1857) to a creature seen by his stalker and his boy in Loch Arkaig (called the lake-horse in local folklore) with a head like that of a horse, and a hollow back.

The old wives' tale that rain follows the new and full moons has now been vindicated by research workers of the U.S. Weather Bureau and of the University of New York, at the Montreal meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. (*The Guardian*, 29 December 1964). It is said that the chances of error are negligible, and though the belief dates from antiquity "this is the first decisive demonstration of the connection between the moon and the weather." It is based in every case on "a moon phase harmonic wave of considerable amplitude" and on rainfall figures that cover all the United States. It is not yet known whether Europe and Britain follow the same correlations, but, as the "superstition" certainly precedes the discovery of America, there is no reason to suppose it should not be true anywhere.

Finally, *Discovery* (December 1964) has an article on the world's first controlled study of *couvade*, by Professor William Trethowan, head of the psychiatry department of Birmingham University, and by Dr. Michael Conlon. *Couvade* is so well recognized in many primitive societies that they have a definite ritual for it. When a wife is pregnant, it has now been proved, the expectant father, in one in nine cases, develops similar symptoms (even sometimes the swollen abdomen), this being brought about, the psychiatrists suggest, by sympathetic identification. It makes no difference if husband and wife are apart. In some cases, symptoms show at the third month, in others at the ninth month, i.e., at the times of announcement and culmination of the pregnancy.

Anthropologists and psychologists are now taking primitive folklore more seriously, and this is all to the good. It may mean the resuscitation of valuable knowledge of natural laws, and help to deflate the fallacious self-esteem of "civilization."

ALL that can be expected from the most perfect institutions is that they should make it possible for individual excellence to develop itself, not that they should produce the excellent individual.

— AMIEL

SOME MUSINGS OF ST. TUKARAM

[TUKARAM was a poet-saint of the early seventeenth century in Maharashtra. He was roughly contemporary with Shivaji, and, no less than the great king, a formative influence on Maharashtra which is still alive. These free translations of a few of his select verses by **Shri D. M. Chitre** of Poona indicate some of the profound sentiments of detachment and devotion that Tukaram sought to inculcate in the society of his time. — ED.]

Father, let my eyes for ever behold thy manifestation!
Sweet is thy name and magnificent thy form.
Grant me thy love for all time to come;
Grant me this boon only, Father:
Live pervasive in my heart.

Whose heart is soft like fleece,
Whose mind is pure to the core,
Who befriends the fallen and lowly,
Who takes to his heart the downtrodden as kith and kin:
He, know well, is a holy man,
In him is God's presence to be seen.

I agree to differ from many—
Each mind has its ways;
Brooding over them all will only corrode time.
Dispute if you will, says, Tukaram,
Leave me alone to follow my way.

(When an invading army besieged his town)

O Lord, mine eyes cannot bear this havoc,
The people's agony pierces my mind;
O Omnipresent, where art thou?
This sight my eyes should not have met;
Never should invaders be seen
In a country where your devotees live.
My service has been shamed, says Tukaram,
And my life turned wretched.

(When King Shivaji sent him rich gifts and attendants to bring him to court)

Of what use are these gorgeous robes and rich presents to me?
They will tend to no good issue.
O Lord, why snarest thou me in these?...
Rescue me from them, O Lord, implores Tukaram.

Meet humbly all that may befall;
Throw not the burden on God.
He, Ocean of Grace, will then avert ill—
How powerless it will seem and small!

Of fear are born mounds of grief;
All's well if you surrender yourself to God. . . .
Meditate now, says Tukaram, on him who sustains the world.

My Lord, Thou hast no form;
I worship Thee in deep contemplation;
My offerings are merely symbolical.
Images are nothing but man's creations.
Thy manifestations I perceive by inward perception.
O Formless, what form can reveal Thee fully?

Blessed are those good men
Who lead a healthy worldly life;
And have love for mankind in their bosoms.
They are born in this world for the betterment of it.
They detest untruth and are averse to happiness and sorrow alike.
They are always sweet-tongued.
Embrace such men to your bosom, exhorts Tukaram.

THE man who lives in his religious centre of personal energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, differs from his previous carnal self in perfectly definite ways. The new ardour which burns in his breast consumes in its glow the lower "noes" which formerly beset him, and keeps him immune against infection from the entire grovelling portion of his nature. Magnanimities once impossible are now easy; paltry conventionalities and mean incentives once tyrannical hold no sway. The stone wall inside of him has fallen, the hardness in his heart has broken down. The rest of us can, I think, imagine this by recalling our state of feeling in those temporary "melting moods" into which either the trials of real life, or the theatre, or a novel sometimes throws us. Especially if we weep! For it is then as if our tears broke through an inveterate inner dam, and let all sorts of ancient peccancies and moral stagnancies drain away, leaving us now washed and soft of heart and open to every nobler leading.

— WILLIAM JAMES